CVE-2023-28325

Auditing session actions allows identification of improper authorization decisions and enforcement failures.

Identity providers centralize and enforce authentication mechanisms, reducing improper authentication.

Enforces correct authorization checks during the identifier assignment process.

Procedures define authorization decisions tied to hiring, transfer, and termination, reducing the likelihood of improper authorization decisions.

Decoys identify and block exploitation of improper authorization by providing monitored targets that mimic protected functions.

Documented procedures facilitate correct implementation and ongoing management of authorization decisions.

Periodic reviews identify and correct flaws in authorization decisions or enforcement.

Establishing permitted attributes and values, plus auditing changes, ensures authorization decisions are based on correctly managed policy data.

A.5.1 only requires the existence of an overarching policy and topic-specific policies (including on access control); it does not itself perform or enforce any authorization check, so the CWE-285 weakness can still be exploited.

Mapping access rights to information classification and business requirements forces correct enforcement of authorization decisions, blocking the incorrect authorization weakness at the policy and implementation stage.

Mandating segregated approval and oversight for non-human identities reduces the chance that weak or orphaned credentials can be exploited for unauthorized authentication.

A.5.17 directly mandates generation of non-guessable unique secrets, secure transmission, immediate change of defaults/temporary creds, strong password enforcement, no-reuse, and compromise response, which stops most improper-authentication exploits at source; the bounded remainder is non-password authentication methods and sufficiency-of-proof cases (e.g. IA-2/IA-5 enhancements) left to other controls.

A.5.18's provisioning, revocation, review and adjustment of access rights (incl. before role changes/termination, with segregation and owner approval) directly stops incorrect authorization decisions from being exploitable in the vast majority of cases; the bounded remainder is incorrectness inside the authorization logic itself (e.g. flawed conditional or missing check) rather than rights that were wrongly granted.

Independent reviewers evaluate whether authorization logic matches policy, thereby reducing the window in which incorrect or missing authorization checks remain in production.