CVE-2023-28840
Mobyproject Moby 1.12.0 – 20.10.24
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:LCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2023-28840 is a high-severity Unprotected Alternate Channel (CWE-420) vulnerability in Mobyproject Moby. Its CVSS base score is 7.5 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Steganography (T1001.002); ranked in the top 15% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2023-1150
Vulnerability Data
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*.…
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Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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- 1 hardening rule · 1 OS baseline
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Likely Mitigating Controls AI
Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.
Supports failing securely by requiring alerts and configurable actions (e.g., shutdown) when the audit mechanism fails instead of continuing without it.
Entering safe mode when conditions are detected prevents failing open and continuing normal operation in a potentially exploitable state.
Directly requires transition to a known (secure) state on failure, preventing fail-open behavior.
Standby components and explicit exchange criteria enforce a controlled, secure failover instead of failing open.
Directly implements fail-safe (fail-closed/secure) behavior on indicated failures, preventing the system from defaulting to an insecure open state.
Usage restrictions and authorization for remote access protect against unprotected alternate channels.
Ensures audit logging continues on primary failure instead of failing open with no logging capability.
Ensures security functions remain enforced via alternatives instead of defaulting to an insecure state when the primary means fails.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Network monitoring can surface use of unprotected alternate channels but does not prevent the design flaw.
Protecting all data-in-transit directly mitigates unequal channel protection though the control addresses broader transit scenarios.
Network protection from unauthorized access inherently requires securing every channel, not just primaries.
Secure SDLC practices directly prevent observable response discrepancies via consistent error handling and timing.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Documented operating procedures may specify exception handling but do not guarantee implementation.
Hardening callouts derived
DISA STIG baselines are authored against specific weaknesses. Where this CVE cites a broad weakness class, the mapping is not asserted at that abstraction (owner ruling, 2026-09-25: grade only at Base and below), so no rule is shown here rather than a rule shown against the wrong grain.