Security Resilience

CVE-2023-28841

Mobyproject Moby 1.12.0 – 20.10.24

Public PoC
Published
04 April 2023
Modified
21 November 2024
Patch / advisory
CVSS Score v3.1 6.8
Click a component to see what it means
Raw vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS Score 0.0069 52th percentile
Risk Priority 56 floored blend · peak EPSS

CVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.

Summary

CVE-2023-28841 is a medium-severity Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data (CWE-311) vulnerability in Mobyproject Moby. Its CVSS base score is 6.8 (Medium).

Operationally, ranked in the top 48% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.

OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)

EU & UK References

Vulnerability Data

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*.…

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Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

CWE(s)

Related Threats

CVEs Like This One

CVE-2023-28842Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2023-28840Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-24557Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-32473Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-36621Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-29018Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-36623Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-36620Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2025-54388Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2025-54410Same product: Mobyproject Moby

Affected Assets

mobyproject
moby
1.12.0 — 20.10.24 · 23.0.0 — 23.0.3

Mitigating Controls

Likely Mitigating Controls AI

Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Supports failing securely by requiring alerts and configurable actions (e.g., shutdown) when the audit mechanism fails instead of continuing without it.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Entering safe mode when conditions are detected prevents failing open and continuing normal operation in a potentially exploitable state.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Directly requires transition to a known (secure) state on failure, preventing fail-open behavior.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Standby components and explicit exchange criteria enforce a controlled, secure failover instead of failing open.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Directly implements fail-safe (fail-closed/secure) behavior on indicated failures, preventing the system from defaulting to an insecure open state.

addresses: CWE-311

Privacy and security training stresses encryption of sensitive data, reducing missing encryption weaknesses.

addresses: CWE-636

Ensures audit logging continues on primary failure instead of failing open with no logging capability.

addresses: CWE-311

Exchange agreements must document security requirements, which would include encryption to protect sensitive data in transit.

Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI

Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.

blocks

Explicit rules requiring encryption for sensitive information in transit eliminate the weakness of sending data without cryptographic protection.

degrades

Documented operating procedures may specify exception handling but do not guarantee implementation.

A.8.15 Logging partial match
finds

Logging captures unhandled exceptions, aiding detection but not preventing the weakness.

finds

Monitoring can surface unhandled exceptions but does not enforce proper handling.

removes

created from the owner's anchor; an owner grade is a row and does not wait for an instrument (Mythos 2026-09-29T15:58Z).

blocks

Secure SDLC mandates exception-handling requirements and testing that directly prevent improper handling of exceptional conditions.

Hardening callouts derived

DISA STIG baselines are authored against specific weaknesses. Where this CVE cites a broad weakness class, the mapping is not asserted at that abstraction (owner ruling, 2026-09-25: grade only at Base and below), so no rule is shown here rather than a rule shown against the wrong grain.

  • No fine-grained STIG row for CWE-311, a class-level weakness. Rules are authored against its narrower children: CWE-312.
  • No fine-grained STIG row for CWE-636, a class-level weakness, and none of its children carries one either.
  • No fine-grained STIG row for CWE-755, a class-level weakness. Rules are authored against its narrower children: CWE-274, CWE-280, CWE-333.

References