A.5.14 Organizational
Information transfer
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (27)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- SC-8mostlycovers — A.5.14's broad requirement to secure all forms of information transfer (including confidentiality and integrity protections) accounts for the bulk of SC-8's transmission protection mandate, but leaves a residual on the target's explicit parameter-driven selection of exactly which properties (confidentiality, integrity, or both) must be protected for each transmission type.
- MP-5partialcovers — A.5.14's broad requirements for securing all forms of information transfer (including policies, procedures, and controls for physical/digital media) address a slice of MP-5's specific media-transport protections, accountability, documentation, and authorization rules, but the bulk of MP-5's detailed, media-focused obligations sit outside A.5.14's general transfer scope.
- SC-7partialcovers — A.5.14's broad requirement to secure all information transfers (internal and external) is only partially accounted for by SC-7's narrower focus on boundary monitoring, subnetwork separation, and managed external interfaces; many transfer protections (e.g., encryption, labeling, agreements) sit outside SC-7.
- CA-3explicit mandateimplements — CA-3 directly operationalizes the information-transfer security requirements that A.5.14 names as its core purpose, including approval, documented interface/security responsibilities, and ongoing review.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (22)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.DS-02mostlycovers — The ISO control's rules and agreements for protecting information during electronic, physical, and verbal transfer directly implement the CSF outcome of safeguarding data-in-transit confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (12)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (2507)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-212partialblocks — Information-transfer rules can require sanitization of sensitive content before sharing.
- CWE-311partialblocks — Explicit rules requiring encryption for sensitive information in transit eliminate the weakness of sending data without cryptographic protection.
- CWE-319partialblocks — Mandating cryptographic protection and stronger authentication on public networks stops the transmission of plaintext sensitive information.
- CWE-523partialblocks — Requires secure information transfer, which can include protecting credentials in transit.
- CWE-924partialblocks — Requires secure information transfer procedures that can include integrity checks.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3457)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1048partialprevents — A.5.14 establishes policy-level constraints on information transfer — approval for external public services, restrictions on automatic forwarding, stronger authentication on public networks, and labelling/chain-of-custody requirements — that, if implemented, would block or constrain some exfiltration channels; however, it is a governance control that mandates rather than enforces prevention, and does not address the core of T1048 where an adversary uses existing protocols covertly, so the prevention is partial and depends on downstream technical controls.
- T1048.003partialprevents — A.5.14 mandates cryptographic protection of information in transit (via 8.24), restrictions on external public services, controls against misrouting, and authentication requirements — all of which directly constrain exfiltration over unencrypted non-C2 protocols. However, it is a policy/agreement framework that depends on implementation through technical controls (A.8.24, network restrictions, DLP), and not all data is classified as sensitive enough to require encryption, so the technique is constrained but not eliminated.
- T1052.001partialprevents — A.5.14 mandates a policy framework for physical storage media transfer that requires authorization, logging, tamper-evident controls, and approved couriers — which constrains USB-based exfiltration when implemented. But the control is procedural/policy-level: it requires other controls (endpoint USB restrictions, DLP, physical security) to actually stop an adversary with system access from using a USB device, and air-gapped scenarios specifically involve unauthorized device introduction that the transfer policy alone cannot prevent.
- T1114partialprevents — A.5.14 mandates cryptographic protection (referencing 8.24), authentication for transfers, and restrictions on automatic forwarding to external addresses, which constrain some T1114 vectors such as in-transit interception and forwarding-rule abuse; however, the technique's core mechanisms — local mailbox access on compromised endpoints, mail server compromise, and credential-based collection of stored mail — sit outside the clause's transfer-focused scope, leaving the bulk of the technique unaddressed.
- T1204.002partialprevents — A.5.14's electronic-transfer controls include malware detection in communications, attachment protection, and approval requirements for external file-sharing services, which can prevent some malicious files from reaching users; however, the clause is fundamentally about transfer security, not user execution, and leaves uncovered vectors such as internal spearphishing, files placed in shared directories, and physical media, plus it cannot stop a user from opening a file that arrived through a legitimate channel.
- T1213.005partialprevents — A.5.14's electronic-transfer clauses require approval before using external messaging services, advise against sending critical information via instant messages, and restrict automatic forwarding — these policies reduce the volume and sensitivity of data that ends up in messaging apps, shrinking what the technique can mine. But the clause does not control access to the messaging platform itself (that is A.5.15/A.5.16/A.8.2), and the technique still runs against whatever data is present; the reduction is a rate, not a closure.
- T1552.008partialprevents — A.5.14's policy guidance on acceptable use of information transfer facilities and advising personnel not to send critical information via insecure channels can reduce the rate at which users share credentials in chat, but it does not prevent the technique from running — adversaries can still access existing chat logs through endpoints, admin portals, or compromised integration tools regardless of policy, and the clause sets requirements rather than mandating technical controls that would block credential collection.
- T1557partialprevents — A.5.14 mandates cryptographic protection (referencing 8.24), stronger authentication on public networks, and controls against interception — which, when implemented, prevent AiTM from successfully extracting usable data. But the policy itself does not implement these controls, the technique (positioning between devices) can still run, and AiTM remains effective for downgrade attacks, DoS, and manipulation regardless of transfer policy. The grade sits below A.8.24's `mostly` against T1040 because A.5.14 is the policy that mandates the technical control rather than the control itself.
- T1557.004partialprevents — A.5.14 mandates cryptographic protection of information in transit and stronger authentication on publicly accessible networks, which—if implemented—prevents the interception/manipulation outcomes of an evil twin connection; however, the control is a policy/agreement framework that does not itself prevent the rogue AP from existing or users from connecting to it, so the technique can still occur even when the policy is fully conformant.
- T1565partialprevents — A.5.14 explicitly requires controls protecting transferred information from modification (item a), including cryptographic techniques (8.24), chain of custody, and non-repudiation, which prevent the in-transit subset of T1565; however, T1565 broadly covers manipulation of data at rest, in applications, and in processing, which A.5.14's transfer-focused scope does not reach.
- T1565.002partialprevents — A.5.14 explicitly mandates controls to protect transferred information from modification — cryptographic techniques (8.24), recipient authentication, tamper-evident packaging, chain of custody — which, when implemented, prevent the network and physical-media vectors of T1565.002. However, the clause is a policy/guidance wrapper that requires implementation rather than implementing controls itself, and it does not reach the in-process manipulation vector ('between system processes') that the technique also describes, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1566.003partialprevents — A.5.14's acceptable-use policy and restrictions on external public services (social media, personal webmail, file sharing) and on automatic forwarding can constrain the channels T1566.003 exploits, but the adversary's outreach occurs outside organizational control, personal devices are out of scope, and the technique is designed to bypass enterprise email controls — so policy reduces the attack surface without closing it.
- T1684.002partialprevents — A.5.14 mandates the policy and agreement framework for information transfer, including requirements for authentication, traceability, non-repudiation, and protection against misrouting — which can require anti-spoofing measures like DMARC/SPF/DKIM and establish third-party transfer agreements. However, it is a governance/procedural control that mandates capabilities rather than implementing the technical controls that actually prevent header spoofing; the prevention depends on those technical controls being deployed, and spoofing remains possible where authentication is weak or absent despite the policy.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (6)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A04partialblocks — A.5.14 mandates topic-specific policies, rules, procedures and agreements that require cryptographic techniques (see 8.24), stronger authentication on public networks, and protections against interception/misrouting for information in transit, directly addressing the 'in transit' slice of A04:2025; it does not address at-rest exposure, weak/misused crypto implementation details, or algorithm selection.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.