CVE-2023-28842
Mobyproject Moby 1.12.0 – 20.10.24
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:NSummary
CVE-2023-28842 is a medium-severity Unprotected Alternate Channel (CWE-420) vulnerability in Mobyproject Moby. Its CVSS base score is 6.8 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Fallback Channels (T1008); ranked in the top 29% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2023-1220
Vulnerability Data
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*.…
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Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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- 1 hardening rule · 1 OS baseline
V3.2.1V7.4.1V8.3.3V10.3.4
Likely Mitigating Controls AI
Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.
Supports failing securely by requiring alerts and configurable actions (e.g., shutdown) when the audit mechanism fails instead of continuing without it.
Entering safe mode when conditions are detected prevents failing open and continuing normal operation in a potentially exploitable state.
Directly requires transition to a known (secure) state on failure, preventing fail-open behavior.
Standby components and explicit exchange criteria enforce a controlled, secure failover instead of failing open.
Directly implements fail-safe (fail-closed/secure) behavior on indicated failures, preventing the system from defaulting to an insecure open state.
Usage restrictions and authorization for remote access protect against unprotected alternate channels.
Ensures audit logging continues on primary failure instead of failing open with no logging capability.
Ensures security functions remain enforced via alternatives instead of defaulting to an insecure state when the primary means fails.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Protecting all data-in-transit directly mitigates unequal channel protection though the control addresses broader transit scenarios.
Network protection from unauthorized access inherently requires securing every channel, not just primaries.
Secure-development practices explicitly include designing error and failure handling to remain in a secure state.
Network monitoring can surface use of unprotected alternate channels but does not prevent the design flaw.
Least-privilege policy and enforcement directly counters the permissive-access fallback example in the CWE.
Hardened baselines and configuration management reduce the chance that error paths default to insecure settings.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development and acceptance verifies correct handling of exceptional conditions.
Access restrictions may cover primary paths but leave alternate channels unprotected unless explicitly extended.
Secure authentication applies to primary channels but does not ensure alternate channels receive the same strength.
Documented operating procedures may specify exception handling but do not guarantee implementation.
Logging captures unhandled exceptions, aiding detection but not preventing the weakness.
Monitoring can surface unhandled exceptions but does not enforce proper handling.