Cyber Resilience

CVE-2023-28842

Mobyproject Moby 1.12.0 – 20.10.24

Published
04 April 2023
Modified
21 November 2024
Patch / advisory
CVSS Score v3.1 6.8
Click a component to see what it means
Raw vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS Score 0.014 71th percentile
Risk Priority 53 floored blend · peak EPSS

Summary

CVE-2023-28842 is a medium-severity Unprotected Alternate Channel (CWE-420) vulnerability in Mobyproject Moby. Its CVSS base score is 6.8 (Medium).

Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Fallback Channels (T1008); ranked in the top 29% of CVEs by exploit likelihood; it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.

OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)

EU & UK References

Vulnerability Data

Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*.…

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Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.

CWE(s)

Related Threats

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques

T1008 Fallback Channels Command And Control
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel.
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Execution
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code.
T1489 Service Stop Impact
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users.
T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service Impact
Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users.
Derived from this CVE’s CWE(s) via the direct CWE→ATT&CK cross-walk.

CVEs Like This One

CVE-2023-28840Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2023-28841Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-36620Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-24557Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2025-54388Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-36621Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-36623Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-29018Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2024-32473Same product: Mobyproject Moby
CVE-2025-54410Same product: Mobyproject Moby

Affected Assets

mobyproject
moby
1.12.0 — 20.10.24 · 23.0.0 — 23.0.3

Mitigating Controls

Control response

Prevent
Stop it (NIST 800-53)

Detect
Catch it (NIST detect / respond)

Harden
Shrink the surface (DISA STIG)
  • 1 hardening rule · 1 OS baseline
Validate
Prove the fix (OWASP ASVS)
  • V3.2.1
  • V7.4.1
  • V8.3.3
  • V10.3.4

Likely Mitigating Controls AI

Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Supports failing securely by requiring alerts and configurable actions (e.g., shutdown) when the audit mechanism fails instead of continuing without it.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Entering safe mode when conditions are detected prevents failing open and continuing normal operation in a potentially exploitable state.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Directly requires transition to a known (secure) state on failure, preventing fail-open behavior.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Standby components and explicit exchange criteria enforce a controlled, secure failover instead of failing open.

addresses: CWE-636 CWE-755

Directly implements fail-safe (fail-closed/secure) behavior on indicated failures, preventing the system from defaulting to an insecure open state.

addresses: CWE-420

Usage restrictions and authorization for remote access protect against unprotected alternate channels.

addresses: CWE-636

Ensures audit logging continues on primary failure instead of failing open with no logging capability.

addresses: CWE-636

Ensures security functions remain enforced via alternatives instead of defaulting to an insecure state when the primary means fails.

Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI

Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.

PR.DS-02 mostly match
prevents

Protecting all data-in-transit directly mitigates unequal channel protection though the control addresses broader transit scenarios.

PR.IR-01 mostly match
prevents

Network protection from unauthorized access inherently requires securing every channel, not just primaries.

PR.PS-06 mostly match
prevents

Secure-development practices explicitly include designing error and failure handling to remain in a secure state.

DE.CM-01 partial match
prevents

Network monitoring can surface use of unprotected alternate channels but does not prevent the design flaw.

PR.AA-05 partial match
prevents

Least-privilege policy and enforcement directly counters the permissive-access fallback example in the CWE.

PR.PS-01 partial match
prevents

Hardened baselines and configuration management reduce the chance that error paths default to insecure settings.

Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI

Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.

finds

Security testing in development and acceptance verifies correct handling of exceptional conditions.

prevents

Access restrictions may cover primary paths but leave alternate channels unprotected unless explicitly extended.

prevents

Secure authentication applies to primary channels but does not ensure alternate channels receive the same strength.

degrades

Documented operating procedures may specify exception handling but do not guarantee implementation.

A.8.15 Logging partial match
finds

Logging captures unhandled exceptions, aiding detection but not preventing the weakness.

finds

Monitoring can surface unhandled exceptions but does not enforce proper handling.

References