Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:NSummary
CVE-2025-46815 is a high-severity Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay (CWE-294) vulnerability in Zitadel Zitadel. Its CVSS base score is 8.0 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Network Sniffing (T1040); ranked at the 37th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-12 (Session Termination) and SC-23 (Session Authenticity) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2025-13619
Vulnerability Data
The identity infrastructure software ZITADEL offers developers the ability to manage user sessions using the Session API. This API enables the use of IdPs for authentication, known as idp intents. Following a successful idp intent, the client receives an id…
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and token on a predefined URI. These id and token can then be used to authenticate the user or their session. However, prior to versions 3.0.0, 2.71.9, and 2.70.10, it was possible to exploit this feature by repeatedly using intents. This allowed an attacker with access to the application’s URI to retrieve the id and token, enabling them to authenticate on behalf of the user. It's important to note that the use of additional factors (MFA) prevents a complete authentication process and, consequently, access to the ZITADEL API. Versions 3.0.0, 2.71.9, and 2.70.10 contain a fix for the issue. No known workarounds other than upgrading are available.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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V10.4.16V10.5.1V4.4.4V7.6.2
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
AC-12 directly requires automatic session termination after a defined period, structurally preventing reuse of expired session identifiers.
Session authenticity mechanisms directly stop replay of captured authentication traffic by enforcing freshness or cryptographic binding.
Transmission integrity (with anti-replay) stops captured messages from being accepted as valid later.
Enforces that only properly authorized (i.e., freshly authenticated) sessions can access resources, making a pre-existing fixed session ID unusable.
Forces re-authentication under defined conditions, which should result in issuance of a fresh session identifier and invalidation of any prior one.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Credential lifecycle management directly includes enforcing session expiration to prevent reuse.
Proper authentication processes must invalidate prior session identifiers to prevent fixation attacks.
Protecting and verifying identity assertions prevents replay of captured authentication material.
Authorization policy enforcement and review covers terminating stale sessions to limit access scope.
Encryption and integrity protections for data-in-transit directly block capture-replay of credentials or tokens.
Network monitoring may detect anomalous replays after the fact but does not prevent the design flaw.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Cryptographic protections (e.g., nonces, timestamps, message authentication codes) make captured authentication messages unusable for replay.
Security testing can detect session-fixation issues, yet the weakness absence does not replace comprehensive testing.
Secure authentication mechanisms directly prevent replay attacks by requiring fresh, non-replayable credentials or tokens.
Access-control policy can mandate session invalidation on re-authentication, but does not prescribe the technical mechanism.
Identity-management procedures can require new session tokens after login, yet the control is broader than session handling.
Authentication-information rules can include session-token lifecycle requirements, but the control focuses on credential management.