Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NSummary
CVE-2025-59704 is a medium-severity Improper Authentication (CWE-287) vulnerability in Entrust Nshield 5C Firmware. Its CVSS base score is 4.6 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Indicator Removal (T1070); ranked at the 12th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-3 (Access Enforcement) and CM-6 (Configuration Settings) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2025-200271
Vulnerability Data
Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7, allow an attacker to gain access the the BIOS menu because is has no password.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI
Why these techniques?
Vulnerabilities enable unauthorized BIOS access without password, undetected physical modifications to firmware and boot chain via JTAG/USB, unverified firmware upgrades, and tamper log editing/clearing, facilitating pre-OS boot execution/persistence, firmware implantation/patching, indicator removal, and impairment of defenses.
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Directly requires the HSM to enforce authentication before permitting entry to the BIOS menu, eliminating the missing-password condition.
Limits physical access to the HSM chassis, thereby reducing the opportunity for an attacker to reach the unprotected BIOS interface.
Mandates application of secure baseline settings, including enabling and configuring a BIOS password on the affected nShield models.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
PR.AA-03 directly enforces authentication mechanisms that eliminate most improper-authentication defects, yet CWE-287 spans additional vectors (missing checks, flawed protocols, session handling) that one control does not fully close.
PR.AA-04 directly enables verification of identity assertions (mostly preventing CWE-287 in that scope) yet leaves many other authentication failure modes unaddressed (only partial prevention overall).
PR.AA-01 supplies and governs credentials/tokens that authentication relies on, removing some weak-credential cases, yet leaves verification logic, missing checks, and protocol flaws untouched.
PR.AA-02 ensures valid enrollment and unique credential binding, which reduces some improper-auth risks at issuance time but leaves runtime claim verification untouched, so each direction only partially addresses the other.
PR.PS-01 can enforce auth-related settings via hardened baselines and default reviews, blocking some config-based instances of CWE-287, yet leaves code-level auth flaws untouched so neither direction reaches mostly.
Patching/maintenance can remediate some known auth vulnerabilities after deployment (partial forward) but does not address the design or implementation of authentication logic itself (none reverse).
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Requiring authentication methods whose strength matches the sensitivity of the data and mandating multi-factor authentication directly blocks attempts to access resources without proving identity.
Verifying user identity before issuing replacement credentials and forcing changes after compromise reduces the likelihood that authentication bypass can be achieved through stolen or weak credentials.
Mandating segregated approval and oversight for non-human identities reduces the chance that weak or orphaned credentials can be exploited for unauthorized authentication.
Requiring authentication mechanisms and technical parameters for secure connections ensures that network services verify user identity before granting access, preventing exploitation of missing or weak authentication.
Security requirements specified early and verified through testing drive the consistent implementation of authentication mechanisms, decreasing the likelihood that authentication steps are omitted or incorrectly applied.
Defining the required level of trust in entity identity and the authentication mechanisms to achieve it ensures that authentication is explicitly addressed rather than omitted.