Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HSummary
CVE-2026-10663 is a medium-severity Use After Free (CWE-416) vulnerability in Zephyrproject Zephyr. Its CVSS base score is 6.1 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Hardware Additions (T1200); ranked at the 5th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-43240
Vulnerability Data
In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is…
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non-NULL. Because UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object. Impact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI
Why these techniques?
Physical USB/rogue device access triggers UAF (CWE-416) for memory corruption/DoS; maps to hardware addition vector and potential priv-esc via corruption.
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
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- 3 hardening rules · 3 OS baselines
V1.4.3
Likely Mitigating Controls AI
Per-CVE control mapping for this CVE has not run yet; the list below is derived from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry.
Use-after-free exploits that achieve arbitrary code execution are blocked or significantly hardened by non-executable pages and ASLR.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly incorporate memory-safety tooling and reviews that prevent most use-after-free defects.
Vulnerability identification processes can discover use-after-free issues via scanning or analysis but do not prevent their introduction.
Routine patching removes known use-after-free instances after they have been introduced in released software.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Security testing in development can detect use-after-free bugs before release.
Secure SDLC mandates memory-safety practices that reduce use-after-free defects.
Application security requirements can specify memory-management rules that mitigate use-after-free.
Secure architecture principles include memory-safety design choices that limit use-after-free exposure.
Secure coding standards directly prescribe avoidance of use-after-free patterns.
Change-management processes help ensure memory-safety fixes are deployed consistently.