Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HCVSS and EPSS are reproduced from their sources (NVD, FIRST EPSS). Risk Priority is our own derived reading, not an NVD score.
Summary
CVE-2026-72897 is a high-severity Out-of-bounds Write (CWE-787) vulnerability in Openssl Library (inferred from references). Its CVSS base score is 7.5 (High).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068); ranked at the 17th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SA-11 (Developer Testing and Evaluation) and SA-15 (Development Process, Standards, and Tools) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-89008
Vulnerability Data
Issue summary: A TLS server that calls SSL_set_SSL_CTX() to switch a connection to a different SSL_CTX part way through a handshake may access memory beyond the end of an internal array if the replacement context knows about more provider signature…
more
algorithms than the context the connection was created from. Applications which never call SSL_set_SSL_CTX() are not affected. Impact summary: A remote peer may be able to cause a small out-of-bounds read, and in some circumstances a fixed-value out-of-bounds write, on the server heap. This may lead to a Denial of Service. CWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write Description: A TLS connection records how many certificate slots it has when it is created, taken from the SSL_CTX that created it: the built-in certificate types plus one slot for each provider TLS-SIGALG entry that context was aware of. That count sizes an internal array of per-slot certificate validity flags. An application may replace a connection's SSL_CTX part way through the handshake by calling SSL_set_SSL_CTX(), most commonly from a servername callback in order to serve a different virtual host. Doing so did not refresh the recorded count. A provider signature algorithm's slot index is its position in the list of whichever context resolves it, so if the replacement context is aware of more of them than the original, an algorithm offered by the peer can resolve to an index beyond the end of the array. Processing the peer's signature algorithms then reads one four byte word past the end for each such algorithm and, where the word read is zero, writes a fixed value over it. A peer offering many of them can corrupt heap metadata and abort the process. Only provider signature algorithms which occupy one of the excess slots, and which the server also has configured, have this effect. Codepoints the replacement context does not recognise are discarded without being resolved to a slot, and provider signature algorithms are usable only from TLS 1.3. The two contexts must therefore be aware of different numbers of provider signature algorithms, which requires separate library contexts, a provider loaded between the two being created, or providers which differ in what they advertise - in 4.0, for example, the default provider advertises SM2 where the FIPS provider does not. A deployment meeting the condition is also unable to negotiate the affected algorithms with legitimate clients, since the same stale count hides the corresponding certificates, so the misconfiguration is likely to be noticed. For that reason, and because the configuration is not the default, this issue has been assessed as Low severity. FIPS impact: no No FIPS modules are affected by this issue as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Developer testing and evaluation (including fuzzing and bounds checks) finds out-of-bounds write flaws before deployment.
Requiring documented secure-development standards and tools can mandate bounds-checked coding practices that avoid the weakness.
Input validation can structurally reject or sanitize data that would otherwise trigger an out-of-bounds write.
Memory-protection mechanisms limit the exploitability and blast radius of a successful out-of-bounds write.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Vulnerability scanning and recording can discover out-of-bounds write flaws so they can be remediated.
Patching or replacing vulnerable software directly eliminates known instances of this coding weakness.
Secure-development practices (static analysis, bounds checking, code review) are the primary means of preventing out-of-bounds writes.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure development life cycle mandates practices that prevent out-of-bounds writes.
Application security requirements can specify bounds-checking and safe memory handling.
Secure architecture and engineering principles reduce the likelihood of buffer overflows.
Secure coding directly addresses out-of-bounds writes through language choice and coding standards.
Security testing in development and acceptance can detect and prevent out-of-bounds write defects.