A.8.11 Technological
Data masking
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (15)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- SI-19mostlycovers — A.8.11's data masking techniques (pseudonymization, redaction, etc.) account for the bulk of the de-identification and effectiveness-evaluation requirements in SI-19, but a residual of SI-19's formal dataset-level PII removal + re-identification risk assessment sits outside pure masking controls.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (15)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.DS-01domain mandateimplements — A.8.11 operationalizes data-at-rest confidentiality protection (a core part of PR.DS-01) by masking sensitive/PII data, which is one principal technical means within that domain but is not the only one named by the outcome.
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (9)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (3232)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-315fullremoves — A.8.11 mandates data masking techniques (encryption, substitution, hashing, nulling) for sensitive data; applied to a system where cookies previously stored sensitive information in cleartext, the masking eliminates the cleartext storage and the weakness no longer exists, with no nameable remainder.
- CWE-315fullprevents — Graded full by the owner: the clause defines data masking to include encryption, so a well-implemented masking programme keeps sensitive data from being stored in cleartext.
- CWE-359fullremoves — Data masking, when applied to a system where it was previously absent, directly removes the exposure of private personal information by obfuscating or anonymizing the data, leaving no instance of the weakness present.
- CWE-1230mostlyblocks — A.8.11's masking techniques (varying numbers and dates, substitution, hashing, anonymization) applied to the underlying data also transform metadata derived from it, and the clause explicitly warns about indirect identification through further data — which is the CWE-1230 mechanism; the remainder is metadata not derived from masked values (file sizes, aggregate counts, system timestamps not covered by the varying-dates technique), which is bounded and nameable.
- CWE-201mostlyblocks — Data-masking techniques can prevent sensitive values from appearing in transmitted payloads.
- CWE-202mostlyblocks — Data masking prevents inference by obscuring sensitive values returned in query results.
- CWE-202mostlyremoves — A.8.11's data masking, pseudonymization and anonymization techniques, well implemented, directly address CWE-202's core mechanism of re-identification through queries — the clause explicitly warns about indirect identification when direct identifiers are anonymised and requires verification that anonymization is adequate; applying it to a system that previously lacked it removes the bulk of the weakness, with a bounded remainder in sophisticated statistical inference attacks that survive even well-designed masking.
- CWE-317mostlyblocks — Data masking directly prevents cleartext display of sensitive GUI data.
- CWE-317mostlyremoves — A.8.11's masking techniques (substitution, nulling, hashing, encryption-with-key) replace cleartext with non-cleartext representations, so applying the clause to a system that previously displayed/stored sensitive data in cleartext in its GUI removes the weakness; the remainder is bounded — GUI elements that fall outside the masking scope (e.g., data not classified as sensitive, or masking applied at the data layer but not propagated to every GUI surface) — keeping it from `full`.
- CWE-359mostlyblocks — Masking or anonymizing personal identifiers limits the amount of private personal information that can be disclosed through application outputs or logs.
- CWE-538mostlyblocks — By ensuring that only the minimum necessary data is present in files or directories that may be reachable by external parties, the control lowers the impact of any subsequent exposure.
- CWE-549mostlyblocks — Data masking directly addresses hiding sensitive values such as passwords on user interfaces.
- CWE-200partialblocks — Data masking hides sensitive data from unauthorized viewers, blocking exploitation of the exposure for masked data, but it only covers data that is explicitly masked and does not address exposures from error messages, debug logs, or indirect information leaks.
- CWE-201partialprevents — A.8.11's purpose is directly aligned with limiting sensitive data exposure, and well-implemented masking at the data layer would prevent sensitive fields from appearing in sent data; however, the clause mandates a practice ('should consider') rather than a mechanism, so coverage depends on implementation rigor and not every transmission path is necessarily masked, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-201partialremoves — Data masking hides sensitive data in output or storage but does not remove the underlying code defect that inserts the data into sent messages in the first place.
- CWE-212partialremoves — A.8.11 mandates data masking techniques including anonymization and deletion, which can remove sensitive information from resources before sharing and thus address some instances of CWE-212; however, its primary focus is access-time masking for queries and displays rather than scrubbing resources (documents, packets, headers, metadata) before transfer, so manifestations like EXIF data in images or internal IPs in headers fall outside its reach.
- CWE-212partialprevents — A.8.11's masking/pseudonymization/anonymization prevents CWE-212 where sensitive data flows through the masking pipeline before sharing (e.g., a JSON response containing a pseudonymized email), but it does not reach the metadata and content-removal cases that dominate CWE-212's observed examples — EXIF tags, internal IPs in headers, reviewer comments in documents — which require explicit scrubbing/sanitization rather than masking.
- CWE-213partialremoves — A.8.11 data masking removes the exposure of sensitive data content (PII fields like SSNs, credit cards) that is one strand of CWE-213, but the weakness class also covers system-information exposures (phpinfo(), DLL listings) and protocol-level exposures (Telnet env info) that masking does not reach, and masking addresses the consequence rather than the underlying developer-policy mismatch.
- CWE-213partialblocks — A.8.11 well implemented masks, pseudonymizes or anonymizes data that other stakeholders (regulators, data subjects, contractual partners) regard as sensitive, which blocks the exposure for those data elements; however, CWE-213 also covers system-level exposures (phpinfo output, DLL listings, protocol-level information exchange per the CVE examples) that data masking does not reach, and the policy-mismatch root cause persists even where masking is applied.
- CWE-219partialblocks — Data masking can make the contents of a wrongly exposed file useless to an attacker where it is applied, but many CWE-219 files such as raw database dumps, credentials, code, or files outside the masking scope remain directly readable, so it blocks only a minority of instances.
- CWE-220partialblocks — A.8.11's masking techniques (encryption, pseudonymization, substitution) applied to the file's contents would prevent an unauthorized FTP reader from extracting the sensitive data, blocking the exploitation; however, the clause is a general data-masking control that does not specifically address FTP-root placement or the access-control defect, and masking may not be applied to every sensitive field in the file, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-313partialprevents — A.8.11's masking techniques include encryption, which prevents cleartext storage of PII when applied before persistence, but the clause is scoped to PII and similar data (not all sensitive information), is advisory ('should consider'), and several listed techniques (substitution, varying numbers) do not reliably prevent cleartext storage of the original value, so only a portion of CWE-313 instances are kept from arising.
- CWE-314partialremoves — A.8.11 lists encryption as one of its data masking techniques, so implementing the clause with encryption for sensitive registry data removes the cleartext weakness; however, the clause's primary purpose is masking (pseudonymization, anonymization, substitution, nulling, hashing) rather than encryption, and not all of these techniques remove the underlying cleartext — only the encryption option directly addresses CWE-314, leaving a nameable remainder where other masking techniques are chosen.
- CWE-319partialblocks — A.8.11 lists encryption as a data masking technique, so sensitive data masked via encryption is no longer in cleartext even if the transmission channel itself is unencrypted, blocking the sniff-and-read exploitation; however, the clause's scope is data masking for storage and display, not transmission channels, so it addresses only the slice of CWE-319 where masking is applied to data that is then sent over an unprotected channel.
- CWE-359partialprevents — A.8.11 well implemented masks, pseudonymizes or anonymizes PII so the data is not held in a form that constitutes exposure, preventing most instances of CWE-359 from arising; the bounded remainder is re-identification through collated data, fields where masking is not applied for operational reasons, and inadequate masking — all of which the clause itself flags as failure modes.
- CWE-524partialblocks — A.8.11's masking techniques (especially encryption) would block exploitation of CWE-524 when applied to cached sensitive data, but the clause does not specifically address caches and the weakness is fundamentally about access control to the cache, which data masking does not reach.
- CWE-525partialblocks — Data masking can hide sensitive data before it is rendered into cached pages, but it does not govern browser caching of unmasked sensitive content such as form input, so exploitation is only partly blocked.
- CWE-526partialremoves — A.8.11 mandates data masking (including encryption) for sensitive data, so where applied to environment variables holding sensitive data the cleartext weakness is removed; however, the clause is a general data-masking control not specifically scoped to environment variables, and organizations commonly apply it to databases and files while leaving environment-variable handling to other practices, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-538partialremoves — A.8.11's masking/pseudonymization techniques can remove the weakness by ensuring sensitive data is masked before it is written to externally-accessible files, but the control addresses data masking generally rather than mandating masking at every file-writing point, so coverage depends on implementation choices and some scenarios (e.g., reversible masking, masking applied after insertion, or data written by components outside the masking programme) leave a nameable remainder.
- CWE-538partialprevents — A.8.11's purpose is to limit exposure of sensitive data and its techniques (encryption, nulling, substitution, hashing) directly address the sensitive-information-in-files problem when applied to data before it is written, but the clause governs data masking as a general practice for processing contexts and does not mandate its application to every file or log write, so the prevention depends on implementation choices and leaves a nameable remainder of unmasked writes.
- CWE-539partialremoves — Data masking applied to cookie contents (encryption, hashing, substitution) removes the 'containing sensitive information' half of the weakness, but the persistence aspect of CWE-539 is untouched and the clause is a general data-masking policy that does not specifically mandate cookie coverage, so only a minority of instances are fully removed.
- CWE-539partialblocks — A.8.11's masking techniques (encryption, substitution, hashing) can be applied to sensitive data stored in cookies, blocking an attacker who reads the cookie from obtaining the cleartext information; however, the clause is a general data-masking control that does not specifically address web cookies or browser storage, and not all cookie contents (e.g., session identifiers the application must read back) can be masked, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-612partialblocks — A.8.11 masks the data before it reaches the index, so unauthorized access to the index yields masked rather than original sensitive information, which blocks exploitation of the underlying data; the index authorization weakness itself is untouched, and the remainder is nameable -- surrounding text in search results, reversible masking, metadata, and sensitive elements the masking did not reach -- so the block is real but partial, mirroring the A.8.20 -> CWE-523 pattern where a control masks the vulnerability over part of the path without removing the defect.
- CWE-921partialblocks — Data masking hides sensitive data within a system, but CWE-921 is about storing data on a device that lacks access control entirely; masking does not stop an attacker from reading or modifying the unprotected storage mechanism.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3308)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1213partialprevents — Data masking prevents extraction of the sensitive values (PII, credentials) the adversary mines for, but the technique itself — accessing and browsing the repository — still runs, and non-masked content (policies, diagrams, source code, file names, metadata, structure) remains fully visible, so only a slice of what T1213 targets is hidden.
- T1213.004partialprevents — Data masking prevents the adversary from extracting usable PII from the CRM, since masked/pseudonymized fields cannot be directly used for follow-on phishing or SIM swapping, but the mining technique still runs against the CRM and may still yield useful data from unmasked fields, metadata, or through indirect identification that the clause itself warns about.
- T1213.006partialprevents — Data masking prevents the adversary from successfully extracting the most sensitive values (PII, financial data) by replacing them with masked/pseudonymized equivalents, so the technique's goal of mining valuable information is partially defeated; however, the technique still runs (the database is still queried), non-masked fields like usernames and hashed passwords remain collectible, and re-identification through correlation can sometimes succeed, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1552.001partialprevents — A.8.11's masking techniques — particularly encryption requiring authorized keys — can prevent credentials stored in files from being read in usable form when found, but the control is scoped to PII/sensitive data display rather than credential storage specifically, the files themselves remain discoverable, and many credentials must remain in plaintext for applications and services to function, leaving a substantial remainder where the technique still succeeds.
- T1589partialprevents — Data masking prevents the slice of T1589 where the adversary harvests identity information from the organization's own data stores (masked PII yields nothing useful), but the technique also spans external sources — social media, victim-owned websites, phishing-for-information elicitation, and active probing of authentication services — none of which A.8.11 reaches.
- T1589.001partialprevents — Data masking (especially hashing) prevents credential gathering from exposed/leaked data sets such as breach dumps and code repositories, but does not prevent gathering via phishing, infostealer logs, social engineering, or dark web purchases — the technique still runs and can succeed through those vectors.
- T1593.003partialprevents — A.8.11 can mask sensitive data before it is exposed in public code repositories, denying the adversary some reconnaissance value, but it does not stop the search itself or remove non-sensitive repository data such as code structure, metadata, or unmasked leaks.
- T1700partialprevents — Data masking limits the sensitivity of what an AI agent can exfiltrate by hiding PII and other sensitive fields, so a successful exfiltration yields less useful data; however, it does not prevent the technique from running, and the AI agent's tool connections may reach unmasked sources, so the protection is a reduction in exposed data rather than a closure of the technique.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (2)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A04partialblocks — A.8.11 directly mandates techniques (encryption, hashing, substitution, etc.) that stop sensitive data from being exposed in the clear, closing the 'absent or weak cryptography' slice of A04; it is only partial because A04 also covers misuse of cryptography (e.g. incorrect algorithm selection, improper key management, padding oracles) which this control does not address.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.