CVE-2024-45192
Matrix Olm ≤ 3.2.16
Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NSummary
CVE-2024-45192 is a medium-severity Covert Timing Channel (CWE-385) vulnerability in Matrix Olm. Its CVSS base score is 5.3 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Data Obfuscation (T1001); ranked at the 42th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to SC-31 (Covert Channel Analysis) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2024-41368
Vulnerability Data
An issue was discovered in Matrix libolm through 3.2.16. Cache-timing attacks can occur due to use of base64 when decoding group session keys. This refers to the libolm implementation of Olm. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no…
more
longer supported by the maintainer.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Covert channel analysis directly identifies timing channels that could leak information.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure development practices (reviews, testing) directly reduce introduction of timing-channel vulnerabilities in code.
Runtime monitoring of hardware/software behavior can detect anomalous timing patterns that indicate covert channels.
Vulnerability identification processes can surface timing-channel weaknesses during design or code analysis.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Detailed logging can reveal timing anomalies but does not prevent covert timing channels.
Continuous monitoring may detect timing-based exfiltration but does not eliminate the channel itself.
Network segmentation reduces attack surface but does not address intra-process timing channels.
Network segregation limits external timing observation but not internal covert timing.
Secure architecture principles can include timing-channel countermeasures but are not specific.
Secure coding guidelines may recommend constant-time algorithms but coverage is not guaranteed.