A.5.7 Organizational
Threat intelligence
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (15)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- SI-5mostlycovers — A.5.7's focus on gathering and using threat intelligence to drive mitigation actions accounts for the bulk of SI-5's receive/generate/disseminate/implement loop for security alerts and advisories, but leaves a residual slice (formal directives, mandatory time-bound implementation, and explicit notification of non-compliance) uncovered by the source.
- PM-16domain mandateimplements — PM-16 operationalizes the threat-awareness and information-sharing outcomes that sit inside the broad threat-intelligence domain named by A.5.7; the link is by subject membership rather than explicit citation of a program.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (16)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- ID.RA-02fullcovers — The ISO control's systematic collection, analysis, and integration of threat intelligence directly fulfills the CSF outcome of receiving cyber threat intelligence from external and internal sources.
- DE.AE-07domain mandateimplements — A.5.7's operational process of gathering and sharing threat intelligence directly gives effect to DE.AE-07's requirement that cyber threat intelligence be integrated into analysis; the link is within the shared domain but not by explicit citation of one in the other.
- ID.RA-03domain mandateimplements — A.5.7's operational collection and sharing of threat intelligence directly gives effect to the identification-and-recording outcome named in ID.RA-03 within the risk-assessment domain
- ID.RA-05domain mandateimplements — A.5.7's operational collection and sharing of threat intelligence directly gives effect to the threat-portion of ID.RA-05's risk-understanding requirement within the shared risk-assessment domain
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (10)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3420)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1037mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface T1037's anomalous boot/logon scripts when indicators or methodologies are known and monitored.
- T1048.003mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of technical indicators, and feeding into detective controls (IDS, firewalls) and test processes directly surfaces the unencrypted non-C2 exfil technique or its indicators in flight or in testing.
- T1053mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of indicators, and explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and test processes directly surface T1053's scheduled-task artifacts and anomalous scheduling behavior.
- T1055.002mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its mandated use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface PE injection indicators and anomalous process behavior in monitored environments.
- T1055.003mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its mandated use as input to intrusion detection, anti-malware and test processes surface Thread Execution Hijacking via indicators, anomalous process behavior and memory anomalies; the remainder is detections that require host telemetry outside the chosen scope of the intelligence program.
- T1055.004mostlydetects — A.5.7 requires collection, analysis and sharing of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators) that is then fed as input into detective controls such as intrusion detection systems and anti-malware solutions, which surfaces APC injection in flight on monitored Windows systems; the remainder is unmonitored processes or intelligence that never reaches detection tooling.
- T1059mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface command/script interpreter abuse when it occurs, with the bounded remainder being purely internal/stealthy interpreter activity outside monitored or shared intel sources.
- T1071.002mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the specific protocol-abuse indicators and anomalous file-transfer traffic described in T1071.002; the remainder is purely internal stealth that blends with expected traffic and is never observed.
- T1132.002mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of technical indicators, and explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) directly surfaces non-standard encoding in C2 traffic; mostly because strategic/tactical layers and non-technical sharing add coverage breadth without deepening detection of this specific technique.
- T1205.001mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of specific-attack details and technical indicators, and use as input to detective controls (e.g. IDS) and testing directly surfaces port-knocking signals or the triggered port behavior.
- T1218.009mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of technical indicators, and feeding into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and test processes directly surfaces this signed-binary proxy technique when indicators or anomalous Regsvcs/Regasm usage appear.
- T1218.014mostlydetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators) and feeds it into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and test processes, which surfaces MMC abuse when indicators or anomalous patterns match known T1218.014 tradecraft; the remainder is novel/undocumented instances before intel exists.
- T1219.002mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the specific tools, indicators and anomalous remote-desktop behaviours of T1219.002; the remainder is non-actionable or pre-compromise strategic intelligence that does not detect the technique in flight.
- T1486mostlydetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators) and feeds it into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes, which surfaces T1486 ransomware behavior in flight or in indicators; mostly because strategic/tactical layers and non-indicator ransomware variants sit outside the direct detection surface.
- T1486mostlyrecovers — A.5.7 threat intelligence is explicitly used as input to risk management, preventive/detective controls, and testing processes that enable backup/recovery capabilities and reduce realized impact of encryption events (e.g., by informing resilient backup strategies against ransomware).
- T1505.003mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of indicators, and use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and testing directly surface web shell presence or activity on the organization's estate.
- T1543.003mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to intrusion detection, anti-malware and test processes surface the service creation/modification, registry changes, driver loading and masquerading artifacts of T1543.003; the remainder is purely internal pre-compromise activity that never reaches monitored sources.
- T1546.003mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to intrusion detection, anti-malware and test processes surface the specific WMI event subscription technique when it is present or executing.
- T1546.012mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface IFEO Registry anomalies, debugger attachments, and silent-exit monitors as indicators when they match known threat patterns.
- T1546.015mostlydetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators) and feeds it into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and testing processes, which surfaces COM hijacking Registry changes or anomalous COM behavior when those indicators are known.
- T1547.001mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder persistence when the indicators or anomalous startup behavior match collected/analyzed threat intel.
- T1547.002mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the registry modification, LSA loading, and related anomalous boot behavior for this Windows persistence technique.
- T1547.010mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the port-monitor DLL load or registry change as anomalous boot-time behavior on Windows.
- T1547.012mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the specific Registry, API, file-placement and spoolsv-loading artifacts of this Windows boot-time technique
- T1552.001mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the presence of credential files or related IOCs in most platform scenarios, with a bounded remainder for purely static/local file-system searches that produce no observable events.
- T1557.001mostlydetects — A.5.7 requires collection, analysis and dissemination of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators) that is then fed into detective controls such as IDS/anti-malware and into security testing, which surfaces LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS poisoning and SMB relay attempts when those indicators are present.
- T1558mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of specific attacks and technical indicators, plus feeding into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes, surfaces T1558's ticket-stealing or forging activity in most cases (e.g. anomalous Kerberos traffic or indicators), with the bounded remainder being stealthy forgeries that evade all indicators.
- T1569mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the abuse of system services/daemons when observable indicators or anomalous behavior are present in collected sources.
- T1574.001mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to intrusion detection, anti-malware and other detective controls surface DLL sideloading, search-order anomalies, phantom references and substitution via IOCs, behavioral analytics and enriched monitoring.
- T1657mostlydetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational/tactical threat intel (indicators, methodologies, specific attacks) plus feeding it into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surfaces financial theft campaigns (ransomware extortion, BEC, etc.) in flight or as patterns, with the bounded remainder being purely internal undetected transfers or novel unshared TTPs.
- T1657mostlyresponds — A.5.7 produces and distributes threat intelligence on attacker methodologies, specific attacks and indicators (tactical/operational layers) that is explicitly fed into incident response processes, technical detective controls and risk management, enabling containment/eradication once financial theft (ransomware extortion, BEC, etc.) is underway; mostly because the clause stops at producing/sharing intelligence rather than executing the response actions themselves.
- T1659mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its mandated use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the specific TTP, indicators and anomalous traffic patterns of content injection; the remainder is pre-compromise upstream ISP-level injection that never reaches monitored organizational channels.
- T1684mostlyresponds — A.5.7 produces and distributes actionable threat intelligence on attacker methodologies (tactical layer) and specific attacks (operational layer) that is fed into incident response, risk processes, and technical detective controls; this directly supports containment/eradication once a social-engineering event is underway, with the bounded remainder being pre-compromise influence attempts that never reach the organization’s estate.
- T1685mostlydetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus explicit use as input to IDS, anti-malware, and other detective controls surface tool-tampering and telemetry-disruption artifacts (e.g. killed EDR processes, altered ETW/Registry/Sysmon state, anomalous sensor behavior) once they occur, though strategic sharing and risk-process integration add coverage without changing the core detection verb.
- T1001.003partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer and use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes can surface impersonated C2 traffic that deviates from expected protocol patterns, but the control's mechanism is upstream collection/analysis rather than direct observation and its scope is limited by relevance and implementation choices.
- T1021.001partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer, collection/analysis of specific attacks and technical indicators, plus feeding into detective controls (IDS) and risk processes, surfaces RDP logins by valid accounts when they match known adversary TTPs or indicators.
- T1021.002partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (including technical indicators of specific attacks) and feeds it into detective controls like IDS and anti-malware as well as risk/test processes, which can surface SMB admin-share abuse when indicators match; this is a genuine but minority slice because the control's mechanism is upstream intelligence production and sharing, not direct observation of the technique itself, and most instances (especially those using only valid accounts without known IOCs) remain unseen.
- T1021.004partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (including technical indicators from specific attacks) and feeds it into detective controls like IDS and anti-malware as well as test processes, which can surface SSH logins by valid accounts when those match known adversary patterns or IOCs; partial because the clause sets requirements for intelligence production and sharing rather than mandating any specific detection mechanism or coverage depth, so what is actually detected is a slice determined by the chosen sources, analysis, and downstream controls.
- T1027.010partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (including specific TTPs, tools like Invoke-Obfuscation, and indicators) and feeds it into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and testing, which surfaces many command-obfuscation instances in flight or in testing; it does not instrument or observe the technique itself, leaving a large remainder of in-process or novel obfuscation unseen.
- T1040partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface network sniffing when it produces observable indicators or anomalous traffic patterns; the remainder is purely passive sniffing that leaves no detectable artifact until exfiltration or later use.
- T1047partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes/shares threat intelligence (including operational IOCs and attacker TTPs) that can feed detection rules in technical controls, but the control itself performs no detection and only supplies input that other mechanisms may use
- T1048partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware, etc.) surface indicators and anomalous exfiltration over alternate protocols (DNS, SMTP, FTP, etc.) once underway; the remainder is pre-compromise acquisition of the alternate channel itself.
- T1055.001partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and test processes surface in-process DLL injection anomalies and indicators when the described collection/analysis/sharing activities are performed.
- T1059.001partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface PowerShell abuse (anomalous commands, known malicious indicators, Empire/PowerSploit patterns) when it occurs on the organization's estate; the remainder is pre-compromise adversary tooling development or use outside monitored scope.
- T1071partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to intrusion detection, anti-malware and other detective controls surface T1071's protocol abuse when it occurs on the monitored estate, with the bounded remainder being pre-compromise acquisition of the technique itself or use on unmonitored external infrastructure.
- T1102.003partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer and use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes can surface indicators of one-way Web-service C2, but the clause's mechanism is collection/analysis/sharing rather than direct observation and its scope is set by relevance and objectives, leaving many in-band uses on popular services undetected.
- T1114.002partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the specific Exchange/Office 365 collection activity via indicators, anomalous access, and tooling patterns.
- T1189partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface drive-by indicators, watering-hole patterns, and anomalous browser behavior; the remainder is purely pre-compromise adversary infrastructure work that never reaches monitored organizational sensors.
- T1190partialprevents — Operational threat intelligence on public-facing application exploits enables timely patching and WAF rule updates, limiting the adversary's success in exploiting those applications for initial access.
- T1190partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface indicators, methodologies and specific attacks matching T1190's exploitation of public-facing apps; the remainder is novel/zero-day exploits without prior indicators.
- T1220partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes/shares threat intel (incl. tactical/operational IOCs and attacker TTPs) that can feed detection rules in IDS, anti-malware, and testing processes, surfacing XSL script abuse when it matches known indicators or patterns; it does not itself instrument or observe the event.
- T1486partialprevents — A.5.7's threat-intelligence cycle (collect/analyze/share) feeds risk management, preventive controls (firewalls/IDS/antimalware), and testing to enable informed actions that stop many T1486 ransomware campaigns before encryption occurs; it does not guarantee prevention of every instance (e.g., novel/zero-day or insider-driven encryption).
- T1496.002partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer and use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes can surface bandwidth anomalies or known hijacking IOCs from internal/external sources, but the control's mechanism is human-driven collection/analysis/sharing rather than direct instrumentation, leaving most in-host or IaaS bandwidth abuse undetected without other tools.
- T1499.001partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes surface the anomalous traffic patterns, resource spikes, or TCP state-table anomalies that are the observable signatures of an OS exhaustion flood.
- T1531partialresponds — A.5.7 produces and shares threat intelligence on attacker methodologies (tactical layer) and specific attacks (operational layer) that is fed into risk management, preventive/detective controls, and testing; this can inform an incident response function once T1531 is underway (e.g., recognizing ransomware patterns that combine account removal with encryption), but the control itself performs no containment or eradication actions.
- T1566partialprevents — Strategic and tactical threat intelligence on phishing campaigns and lures informs user awareness programs and email filtering, lowering the likelihood that users will execute malicious attachments or links.
- T1566partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes/shares threat intel (incl. tactical/operational IOCs, attacker TTPs and phishing patterns) that feeds technical detective controls and risk processes, enabling detection of phishing campaigns; it does not itself perform detection.
- T1583.001partialdetects — Threat intelligence explicitly collects from external sources and its operational layer covers technical indicators, enabling detection of some T1583.001 instances through newly-registered-domain feeds, lookalike-domain monitoring, and threat-actor infrastructure tracking; the extent is partial because many domain acquisitions fall outside any feed, coverage depends on which sources the organisation subscribes to, and detection is typically retrospective rather than at the moment of registration.
- T1583.006partialprevents — A.5.7's collection/analysis of tactical/operational threat intel on attacker methodologies and indicators, when fed into risk management and preventive controls, can block some common web-service registrations or downstream abuse, but does not stop the adversary technique of simply registering for legitimate services.
- T1584partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis/sharing of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators) and its use as input to detective controls like IDS can surface T1584 activity or IOCs after the compromise occurs, but this is only a slice of the broad pre-attack technique that also includes strategic/tactical intel and non-detectable infrastructure compromises.
- T1584partialprevents — Threat intelligence on attacker methodologies, tools, emerging TTPs, and specific IOCs (tactical/operational layers) is explicitly used as input to preventive controls (firewalls, IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes that can block compromise of infrastructure before it occurs.
- T1588.001partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer and use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes can surface acquisition activity or the resulting malware indicators, but the control is primarily about awareness production rather than real-time detection of the PRE technique itself.
- T1588.001partialprevents — Threat intelligence on attacker methodologies, tools, malware sources (tactical/operational layers) and feeding it into risk management, preventive controls, and testing processes enables informed actions that can stop adversaries from successfully acquiring and using malware in many cases, but does not guarantee prevention of all such acquisitions.
- T1588.002partialprevents — A.5.7's collection/analysis of tactical/operational threat intelligence on attacker tools and methodologies, when fed into risk management and technical preventive controls, can stop some tool-acquisition paths from being viable, but does not block the majority of acquisition methods (buying, downloading, stealing, cracking) described in the technique.
- T1588.005partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators, exploit forums, newly discovered exploits) and its use as input to detective controls like IDS can surface adversary acquisition or monitoring of exploits, but this is limited to known indicators and does not broadly detect the technique itself.
- T1588.005partialprevents — Threat intelligence on attacker methodologies, tools, exploit marketplaces, forums, and newly discovered exploits (tactical/operational layers) is explicitly used to feed risk management, preventive controls (firewalls/IDS/antimalware), and testing — enabling informed actions that stop many (but not all) purchased/stolen/downloaded exploits from being successfully used against the organization.
- T1588.006partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks and technical indicators) and its use as input to detective controls like IDS can surface adversary monitoring of vulnerability disclosures, but this is only one narrow slice of the technique's full scope (which also includes closed databases, targeting researchers, and exploit development).
- T1588.006partialprevents — A.5.7's collection/analysis of threat intel (including tactical/operational details on vulnerabilities and attacker methodologies) feeds risk management, preventive controls, and testing to enable actions that stop many vulnerability-acquisition paths from succeeding, but does not block open-source monitoring, closed DB access, or vendor targeting itself.
- T1589.001partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators, dark-web markets, breach dumps) and its feeding into detective controls and risk processes surfaces credential-gathering activity, but only for known patterns from vetted sources rather than novel or internal leaks.
- T1589.001partialprevents — Threat intelligence (strategic/tactical/operational) that is relevant, insightful, contextual and actionable directly feeds risk management, preventive controls (firewalls/IDS/antimalware), and testing to stop credential-gathering techniques such as phishing elicitation, credential leaks, dark-web purchases and infostealer logs from succeeding against the organization.
- T1591partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators) and its use as input to detective controls (e.g. IDS) and risk processes can surface T1591 activity when it matches known patterns or sources, but this is limited to a minority slice of the broad, passive/pre-attack reconnaissance technique that often leaves no detectable signal.
- T1591partialprevents — A.5.7's collection/analysis of tactical/operational threat intel (attacker methodologies, tools, indicators) plus feeding it into risk management, preventive controls, and testing processes enables informed actions that stop adversaries from successfully gathering victim org details via exposed data sets or elicitation.
- T1591.002partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators) and its use as input to detective controls (e.g. IDS) and risk processes can surface T1591.002 activity when it matches known threat patterns, but this is limited to post-exposure detection of known patterns rather than reliably detecting novel or internal business-relationship gathering.
- T1591.002partialprevents — A.5.7's collection/analysis of tactical/operational threat intel (attacker methodologies, specific TTPs, indicators) and its use as input to preventive controls and risk processes can inform actions that stop adversaries from successfully gathering business-relationship data via phishing, open-source searches, or supply-chain vectors, but it is not a direct barrier and leaves many passive exposure paths untouched.
- T1591.004partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators) and its use as input to detective controls (e.g. IDS) and risk processes can surface the reconnaissance technique when it matches known patterns or sources, but this is limited to cases where the intel already exists and the org has chosen to instrument for it.
- T1591.004partialprevents — A.5.7's collection/analysis of tactical/operational threat intel (attacker methodologies, specific TTPs, indicators) plus feeding it into risk management, preventive controls, and testing processes enables informed actions that can block or constrain the reconnaissance technique before it succeeds, but only for a minority slice (known patterns already surfaced in intel) rather than the dominant open-source/OSINT paths that remain available.
- T1595partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer and use as input to detective controls (IDS, firewalls, anti-malware) and risk processes can surface active scanning in flight or in logs when it targets the organization, but the control's mechanism is upstream collection/analysis rather than direct observation and much of pre-compromise external scanning occurs outside monitored organizational scope
- T1595.002partialdetects — A.5.7's operational layer and use as input to detective controls (IDS, firewalls, anti-malware) and risk processes can surface scanning activity once it reaches the organization's estate (e.g. inbound probes against banners/ports), but the technique occurs pre-compromise on external infrastructure or unaffiliated targets with no guaranteed internal vantage, leaving a large slice unseen.
- T1598partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes threat intel (incl. tactical/operational indicators and attacker methodologies) that can feed detective controls and risk processes, enabling detection of phishing-for-info campaigns or related TTPs; it does not itself perform detection and its scope is limited to relevant/actionable intel that the org elects to ingest.
- T1608.002partialdetects — Threat intelligence's mechanism is collecting from external sources (vendor feeds, sharing communities, researcher reports), which CAN surface tool uploads to public services like GitHub repos or PaaS offerings — a legitimate use case for tactical and operational intelligence. However, uploads to private adversary infrastructure often remain invisible until the tool is used downstream, and the control's primary purpose is awareness rather than operational detection, so coverage is a slice rather than comprehensive.
- T1608.004partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis/sharing of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators, attacker methodologies) and its use as input to detective controls like IDS can surface T1608.004 staging activity when observed in the wild, but the control is scoped to known/relevant threats and does not mandate instrumentation that would catch novel or internal preparation.
- T1608.004partialprevents — Threat intelligence on attacker methodologies, tools, watering-hole patterns, malvertising, and infrastructure acquisition directly feeds risk processes, preventive controls (firewalls/IDS/antimalware), and testing to stop staging of drive-by resources before the technique runs.
- T1608.005partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, technical indicators) and its use as input to detective controls (e.g. IDS, anti-malware) and testing can surface T1608.005 infrastructure/setup indicators, but this is limited to known patterns shared via intel sources and does not broadly detect novel/pre-deployment adversary link-target preparation on PRE platforms.
- T1608.005partialprevents — Threat intelligence on attacker methodologies, tools, phishing infrastructure (domains, link shorteners, IPFS), and indicators directly feeds preventive controls and risk processes that can block or disrupt setup of link targets before the technique runs.
- T1654partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical threat intelligence layers, plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware, SIEM) and risk processes, surface log-enumeration activity when it matches known adversary methodologies, tools (wevtutil, PowerShell, CollectGuestLogs), or real-time monitoring patterns, with the bounded remainder being novel/undocumented instances or environments lacking integrated detection feeds.
- T1665partialdetects — A.5.7's operational and tactical layers plus its explicit use as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware, etc.) surface indicators, methodologies and artifacts of hidden C2 infrastructure; the remainder is purely strategic or pre-compromise resource-development activity outside the organization's visibility.
- T1681partialdetects — A.5.7's collection/analysis/sharing of operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators, actor methodologies) directly surfaces when adversaries perform T1681 reconnaissance on their own campaigns in vendor data, feeding risk processes and technical controls that can flag the activity.
- T1681partialprevents — A.5.7's core purpose and outputs (collect/analyze/share relevant, insightful, actionable threat intel on attacker TTPs, indicators, and campaigns) directly feed risk management, preventive controls (firewalls/IDS/antimalware), and testing to enable informed actions that stop the reconnaissance technique from succeeding or recurring, but this is governance-level intel production rather than a technical barrier that universally blocks the PRE technique.
- T1684partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators) and feeds it into detective controls and test processes, which can surface social engineering attempts in flight or in logs; partial because the clause's mechanism is upstream intelligence production rather than direct observation, many social-engineering deliveries (e.g. voice, in-person, or pre-compromise trust-building) leave no detectable artifact inside the organization's monitored estate, and relevance/context filters may exclude the technique entirely.
- T1684.001partialdetects — A.5.7 collects/analyzes operational threat intelligence (specific attacks, indicators) and feeds it into detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and risk processes, which can surface impersonation campaigns once observed; partial because the clause sets requirements for intelligence production rather than mandating detection coverage of all impersonation vectors (e.g. non-technical social engineering, novel TTPs, or pre-delivery reconnaissance) and detection ultimately depends on downstream controls' scope.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (5)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A03partialfinds — A.5.7's analysis and integration of threat intelligence into risk processes and technical controls (e.g. IDS, anti-malware) can surface indicators of compromised supply-chain elements or known vulnerable dependencies after they are present, but this is only one slice of the broad A03 category (most supply-chain failures are found via scanning or code inspection, not threat intel).
- A09partialfinds — A.5.7's analysis and use of threat intelligence as input to detective controls (IDS, anti-malware) and security testing surfaces some logging/alerting failures when they match known threat patterns, but does not discover the absence of logging itself or most integrity failures.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.