A.8.12 Technological
Data leakage prevention
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (19)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- AC-4partialcovers — A.8.12's DLP mechanisms (monitoring, filtering, blocking) for preventing unauthorized extraction implement a concrete slice of ac-4's information-flow enforcement policy, but ac-4's broader approved-authorization model, parameter-driven policy scope, and system-internal flows sit mostly outside A.8.12.
- SI-4partialcovers — A.8.12's focus on detecting/preventing data leakage (exfiltration) addresses only a narrow slice of SI-4's broad system monitoring objectives that also include attack detection, unauthorized connections, and general unauthorized use
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (22)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- DE.CM-03domain mandateimplements — A.8.12's detection function directly operationalizes the monitoring of personnel activity and technology usage that DE.CM-03 names as its end-state, within the same adverse-event detection domain (though the CSF outcome does not name DLP specifically)
- PR.DS-02domain mandateimplements — A.8.12's technical mechanisms for preventing unauthorized extraction and disclosure of information give operational effect to protecting confidentiality of data-in-transit within PR.DS-02's domain (though the CSF outcome does not name DLP specifically)
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (10)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (3247)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-1323mostlyblocks — DLP mechanisms can detect and block exfiltration of trace data.
- CWE-359mostlyblocks — A.8.12's core purpose and mechanisms (monitoring channels, detecting disclosures, blocking transmissions, DLP tools that quarantine or prevent copy/paste/upload of sensitive data) directly stop unauthorized extraction/exposure of private personal information; the bounded remainder is non-technical leaks (e.g. screenshots addressed only by training/auditing, or adversary deception via honeypots)
- CWE-402mostlyfinds — Data-leakage-prevention technologies specifically block unintended transmission of sensitive resources.
- CWE-524mostlyblocks — Data leakage prevention can block unauthorized access to cached sensitive information.
- CWE-1230partialfinds — DLP solutions can detect and block metadata leakage, yet are not designed solely for this weakness.
- CWE-1230partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools can block exfiltration of metadata-derived sensitive information through monitored channels (email, uploads, copy/paste), but the weakness is that metadata is accessible through the application's own functionality (search indices, activity dates, statistical reports), which DLP does not restrict — it operates at egress, not at the access-decision point where CWE-1230 is exploited.
- CWE-1426partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect and block exfiltration of sensitive information that appears in unvalidated generative AI output (e.g., PII generated by the model being emailed or uploaded), but the core validation weakness remains and other exploitation paths — XSS from model output, agent invocation, downstream command execution — are not reached by data-leakage controls at the channel boundary.
- CWE-200partialfinds — By continuously inspecting data flows and blocking transmissions that contain classified sensitive content, the control stops the unauthorized release of information that would otherwise occur through missing or bypassed access-control checks.
- CWE-201partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect and block outbound transmissions containing sensitive data patterns (e.g., credentials in error messages, email addresses in API responses), masking the code defect during egress, but the application-level weakness remains and many instances — internal transmissions, novel data formats like heap addresses, legitimate API responses to authorized recipients within the trust boundary — fall outside DLP's monitored channels.
- CWE-202partialfinds — DLP can detect and block queries or result sets that risk exposing sensitive information.
- CWE-212partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools detect and block transmission of sensitive content through monitored channels (email, file transfers, uploads to untrusted services), which stops exploitation of CWE-212 along those paths, but the weakness remains in the product and many disclosure vectors (API responses, channels DLP does not inspect, metadata patterns DLP does not parse) are outside the control's reach.
- CWE-213partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools can block exfiltration of classified sensitive information via monitored channels (email, upload, copy/paste), but CWE-213 is precisely the case where the developer's classification omits information other stakeholders consider sensitive, so the DLP tools configured to the developer's policy will not act on it; the core exposure (phpinfo-style web output, protocol-level disclosure, API responses displaying SSNs) is not reached by A.8.12's channel-blocking mechanism.
- CWE-312partialfinds — When clear-text sensitive data is detected leaving controlled storage, the control can block the transfer, thereby limiting the exposure that would result from unencrypted storage on external media or cloud services.
- CWE-312partialblocks — DLP blocks many exfiltration paths such as email, upload, and copy/paste of cleartext-sensitive data, but it does not stop an unauthorized actor with access to the stored resource from reading the cleartext directly.
- CWE-313partialfinds — DLP can detect and block attempts to write sensitive data in cleartext.
- CWE-319partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools can block network transmissions and user actions that expose sensitive information in cleartext (quarantining emails, blocking uploads, inspecting egress traffic), which directly stops exploitation of many CWE-319 instances at monitored channels; the remainder is bounded and nameable — hardware-specific channels like JTAG, internal traffic that does not traverse DLP inspection points, and transmissions where the data pattern is not recognized — so the weakness remains present in the product's design while DLP denies exploitation over a meaningful but minority portion of paths.
- CWE-5partialblocks — A.8.12 can block identified sensitive data from leaving over monitored channels such as email, file transfer, or upload, but it does not enforce HTTPS or inspect every plaintext application path, so unmonitored or unclassified traffic remains exploitable.
- CWE-512partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools block exfiltration of sensitive data through monitored channels (email, uploads, copy/paste), denying the spyware use of those paths, but the unauthorized collection itself and exfiltration via covert/encrypted channels that evade DLP remain exploitable.
- CWE-515partialfinds — DLP can detect or block covert storage flows but does not address all covert storage techniques.
- CWE-530partialblocks — A.8.12's data leakage prevention tools can block the network transmission or user action that exposes a backup file to an unauthorized control sphere, but the clause does not address the root cause of the file being stored in an accessible location in the first place, leaving the weakness present and exploitable through channels not monitored by DLP.
- CWE-530partialremoves — A.8.12's backup protection paragraph recommends access control (and encryption/physical protection) for backup storage media, which would remove CWE-530 instances where exposed backups reside on inadequately protected storage; however, this is a secondary paragraph in a DLP-focused clause, and the primary mechanisms (channel monitoring, exfiltration blocking) do not address backup files left in web-accessible directories or other non-storage-media locations.
- CWE-538partialblocks — A.8.12's DLP tools can block exfiltration channels for sensitive information placed in accessible files (blocking copy, email, upload to cloud services), denying the attacker use of the weakness over those paths; but the weakness itself remains present and DLP does not stop actors with legitimate file access from reading the file directly, leaving a nameable remainder.
- CWE-941partialblocks — DLP can block or quarantine outbound transmissions containing sensitive information to unauthorized destinations, which stops the data-theft subset of CWE-941, but it does not stop destination misdirection used for DoS/reflection attacks or involving non-sensitive traffic.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (3705)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1003.007mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels for leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including in unstructured data, uploads, email), and acting on it; credentials in /proc memory match the sensitive-data patterns these tools target on Linux systems, though coverage is not exhaustive for all in-memory credential patterns or non-monitored processes.
- T1041mostlyprevents — By inspecting traffic on common exfiltration channels such as email or web uploads, DLP can interrupt data being sent over established C2 channels.
- T1048mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (e.g. uploads to untrusted cloud services or via email), which directly surfaces T1048 exfiltration over alternate protocols such as FTP/SMTP/HTTP/S/DNS/SMB.
- T1048.003mostlydetects — A.8.12's purpose is explicitly 'to detect and prevent the unauthorized disclosure and extraction of information,' and its tools clause names detecting disclosure via email and uploads to untrusted services — T1048.003 is unencrypted exfiltration over non-C2 protocols, so the data is in the clear and inspectable by DLP. Mostly and not full because detection depends on what the organization has classified and what patterns the DLP is configured to match, and obfuscation (base64, header embedding) can evade content inspection.
- T1052mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly names 'portable storage devices' as a channel to monitor and DLP tools are designed to detect sensitive data being written to removable media, which is the primary mechanism of T1052; the bounded remainder is physical exfiltration that bypasses endpoint DLP — photographs of screens, unmanaged personal devices, and air-gapped transfers — which the clause addresses through terms-of-use, training and auditing rather than detection.
- T1052.001mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly names portable storage devices as a channel to monitor and requires DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information, which directly covers USB exfiltration of tagged/classified data; the bounded remainder is unclassified data, air-gapped estates without endpoint DLP, and bypass techniques that evade USB-port monitoring.
- T1052.001mostlyprevents — A.8.12 explicitly names portable storage devices as a channel to monitor and block, and DLP tools can prevent copying of recognized sensitive data to USB; the bounded remainder is unmarked data, air-gapped scenarios where DLP is not deployed, and physical bypass.
- T1078.002mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including when uploaded or sent), and acting on it; domain account abuse frequently produces observable data exfiltration or anomalous credential use that such monitoring surfaces.
- T1087.003mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels (email, file transfers) and using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (e.g. when uploaded or sent via email), which surfaces attempts to enumerate or exfiltrate email accounts/addresses via those vectors; the remainder is non-email vectors such as direct API or memory-resident enumeration outside monitored channels.
- T1104mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including network transmissions, uploads, and exfiltration), which surfaces the outbound C2 staging, file uploads, and multi-stage callbacks described in T1104.
- T1105mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including uploads to untrusted services, email, file transfers), and acting on detected events, which surfaces most T1105 ingress tool transfers that move files across monitored boundaries or channels.
- T1185mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including when uploaded or sent), and acting on it; browser session hijacking that inherits sessions/cookies or pivots traffic to exfiltrate intranet data or bypass auth is a data-leakage event that such monitoring and tools would surface.
- T1219mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (e.g. uploads to untrusted cloud services or email), and acting on detected events, which surfaces post-compromise use of remote access tools when they transmit or exfiltrate data.
- T1219.002mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including when transmitted via untrusted services or tools), which surfaces adversary use of remote desktop software for C2 exfiltration or interactive access carrying sensitive data.
- T1530mostlyprevents — DLP monitors uploads to untrusted cloud storage services, preventing the bulk transfer of sensitive files stored in cloud repositories.
- T1546.015mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels for leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including via uploads, email, or other exfiltration), and the COM hijacking technique (especially its TypeLib variation) can be surfaced when it triggers outbound network activity, remote script fetches, or anomalous registry-triggered behavior that DLP or related monitoring observes.
- T1555.005mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive information at risk, and detecting its disclosure (including via tools that surface unauthorized extraction or upload), which directly surfaces the technique of credential extraction from unlocked password-manager memory/databases on endpoints.
- T1565mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive data at risk, and detecting its disclosure (e.g. uploads to untrusted clouds or email), which surfaces T1565 manipulations once they occur on monitored vectors; the remainder is offline or non-channel manipulations outside DLP scope.
- T1565.001mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive data at risk, and using DLP tools to detect disclosure or exfiltration attempts, which surfaces stored-data manipulation when it involves monitored channels or sensitive information movement (e.g. upload, copy, backup); the remainder is stealthy offline manipulation of non-monitored local files that never triggers a channel or tool.
- T1567mostlydetects — Web-service DLP rules detect and block the posting or uploading of sensitive information to external web or cloud destinations.
- T1567.002mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly names 'uploaded to untrusted third-party cloud services' as an example of what DLP tools detect, which is the exact mechanism of T1567.002; the bounded remainder is encrypted or otherwise obfuscated payloads and uploads from devices or channels outside DLP's instrumentation scope.
- T1571mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage (email, file transfers, network transmissions, cloud uploads) and using DLP tools to detect when sensitive information is disclosed or exfiltrated, which surfaces non-standard port C2 that carries such data; the remainder is purely protocol-muddling use with no sensitive payload.
- T1574.001mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to identify/monitor sensitive information at risk and detect its disclosure (including via file transfers, uploads, and system-level actions), which surfaces most DLL sideloading/hijacking/substitution behaviors when they involve observable movement or loading of sensitive DLLs, with a bounded remainder for purely in-memory or non-sensitive cases.
- T1602.001mostlydetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels for leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including via network transmissions), and the MIB dump is a network query that can expose configuration, routing, and other sensitive data the control is oriented to detect.
- T1005partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect the disclosure of sensitive information when it is uploaded or sent via email, but T1005 is the local collection of data before exfiltration, and DLP monitoring of channels like email and file transfers does not observe an adversary searching the local file system.
- T1005partialprevents — A.8.12 can block the exfiltration channel (e.g., email, upload) and prevent copy-paste to external media, but it does not prevent the adversary from searching and staging data on the local system itself, which is the core of T1005.
- T1011partialdetects — A.8.12's monitoring of channels (including mobile devices and portable storage) and its DLP tool guidance for detecting disclosure of sensitive information can surface some alternative-medium exfiltration on managed endpoints (e.g., Bluetooth or cellular on corporate devices), but the technique explicitly targets channels not routed through the enterprise network — RF, proximity-based, and unmanaged radio links — which sit largely outside the vantage point of standard DLP monitoring.
- T1011partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools monitor channels like email, file transfers, mobile devices and portable storage, and can block transmissions exposing sensitive information, which catches some alternative-medium exfiltration (e.g., Bluetooth or cellular on managed endpoints, or transfers that still traverse monitored enterprise paths); however, the technique's defining feature is using a channel that bypasses the enterprise network entirely (WiFi, Bluetooth, RF, cellular modems not routed through corporate infrastructure), and A.8.12's scope is the enterprise-routed estate, so a meaningful slice of the technique's vectors sit outside what the clause monitors or blocks.
- T1011.001partialdetects — A.8.12's scope includes mobile devices as a channel to monitor, and some endpoint DLP can inspect Bluetooth radio activity, but the typical implementation focuses on network, email, clipboard and removable-media channels — Bluetooth peer-to-peer transfers generally bypass the enterprise network and are not inspected by most DLP tools, so detection is a slice of the channel rather than coverage of it.
- T1011.001partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP framework explicitly mentions mobile devices among the channels to monitor and could be extended to Bluetooth, but the specific mechanisms described — email quarantine, file-transfer monitoring, network transmission blocking, copy/paste restrictions — are oriented around enterprise network and cloud channels that Bluetooth peer-to-peer traffic typically bypasses, which is precisely why adversaries choose this channel.
- T1020partialdetects — A.8.12's monitoring of data leakage channels can detect automated exfiltration when it occurs over monitored vectors like email or file transfers, but automated exfiltration can use unmonitored channels or encryption that evades DLP inspection, leaving a significant remainder.
- T1020partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools block user actions and network transmissions that expose sensitive information (email quarantine, blocking uploads to untrusted services, preventing copy/paste), which addresses the data-movement half of T1020; the automation wrapper itself is not what DLP stops, and the channels automated exfiltration can use (encrypted C2, DNS, alternative protocols) extend beyond what DLP reliably covers, matching the partial grade already given to A.8.12 vs T1048.
- T1021.007partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels of data leakage including uploads to third-party cloud services and can detect sensitive data being moved to/from cloud services, but T1021.007's core mechanism is authenticating to cloud services via federated valid accounts, which is an identity/access event outside A.8.12's monitoring scope.
- T1025partialdetects — DLP policies can detect and block the transfer of classified data onto removable media, directly preventing collection via USB or other portable devices.
- T1029partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors data leakage channels and detects disclosure of sensitive information, which can surface scheduled exfiltration when it occurs, but the technique's timing-based evasion is designed to blend with normal activity and may evade detection during the scheduled window.
- T1029partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP mechanisms (content inspection, channel monitoring, blocking transmissions) act on the underlying exfiltration that T1029 schedules, so where they block the data leaving, the scheduled transfer cannot complete; but the clause does not address the timing/scheduling mechanism itself, and the same partial remainder that applies to T1048 applies here — channels and behaviours outside DLP scope, encrypted payloads, and insider paths the tools do not see.
- T1030partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels of data leakage and detects disclosure of sensitive information, but T1030's chunked transfers are designed to evade volume-based thresholds, so detection is possible through content inspection but not guaranteed against a technique that deliberately stays below alerting limits.
- T1030partialprevents — A.8.12's content-based DLP identifies and blocks sensitive information regardless of transfer size, so the chunking that defeats volume-threshold alerts does not defeat A.8.12's primary mechanism; the same scope limits that bound the T1048 anchor apply here — unclassified data, unmonitored channels, encrypted payloads, and user actions outside instrumented paths remain reachable.
- T1039partialdetects — A.8.12 DLP tools detect disclosure of sensitive information and can flag unusual access or bulk copying from network shares, but T1039's core action — an adversary already on a system browsing/searching shares for files of interest — is largely internal data discovery that DLP's egress-oriented monitoring does not comprehensively see; detection catches the movement/preparation-to-exfiltrate slice, not the share enumeration itself.
- T1040partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage (email, file transfers, portable devices) and using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (e.g. uploads to untrusted cloud or email), which surfaces some sniffing-derived exfiltration of cleartext credentials or data; this is a genuine but minority slice of T1040's passive capture mechanics across platforms, with the bulk (e.g. on-wire promiscuous mode, span ports, cloud mirroring, network device CLI captures) outside DLP's typical vantage.
- T1041partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect sensitive content patterns and anomalous data volumes in outbound traffic, which catches some T1041 instances, but the technique is specifically designed to evade detection by encoding stolen data into the same protocol as legitimate C2 communications, and the clause's enumerated channels (email, file transfers, cloud uploads, portable storage) do not include C2 channels where this technique operates.
- T1048partialprevents — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels and blocking transmissions (including via DLP tools that stop uploads, email, file transfers, and copy actions) that would realize exfiltration over alternate protocols such as FTP/SMTP/HTTP/S/SMB; the named remainder is adversary use of encryption/obfuscation, cloud console/API downloads inside authorized sessions, or non-monitored channels.
- T1048partialresponds — A.8.12 explicitly requires acting on detected leakage (quarantine, block transmissions, DLP tools that stop exfiltration) and responding to adversary intelligence actions (e.g. honeypots, disinformation as response), which engages containment/eradication once T1048 exfiltration is underway; partial because it is scoped to monitored channels/sensitive data and does not address all alternate-protocol cases (e.g. DNS, SMB, or IaaS console downloads outside DLP scope).
- T1048.001partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly tasks DLP tools with detecting disclosure of sensitive information, and endpoint DLP can observe the file access, encryption and staging before egress; however, symmetric encryption applied at the source defeats content-based inspection at the network egress point, so what is caught is the behavioral and endpoint slice rather than the bulk of the mechanism.
- T1048.001partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can still block some exfiltration via protocol restrictions, destination blocks, and volume-based detection, but symmetric encryption specifically defeats the content-inspection mechanism that is DLP's primary preventive strength — the tool sees ciphertext and cannot match sensitive patterns, so the core content-based blocking is bypassed.
- T1048.002partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels and detects disclosure of sensitive information, but T1048.002 uses asymmetric encryption that obscures content, so detection is limited to metadata and traffic patterns rather than the exfiltrated data itself.
- T1048.002partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can identify sensitive data at endpoints before it is encrypted and block its transmission, but asymmetric encryption (HTTPS/TLS) defeats network-based content inspection without TLS interception, and adversaries can use channels outside DLP's configured scope, leaving a meaningful remainder consistent with the parent T1048 anchor.
- T1048.003partialprevents — A.8.12 explicitly monitors channels of data leakage and blocks network transmissions that expose sensitive information, which directly addresses exfiltration over unencrypted protocols; however, the technique's use of encoding/compression (base64) and embedding data in protocol headers/fields can evade content-based DLP inspection, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1048.003partialresponds — A.8.12 explicitly requires acting on detected leakage (quarantine, block transmissions, DLP tools that stop exfiltration) and responding to adversary intelligence actions (e.g. honeypots, disinformation as response), which engages the containment/eradication core of `responds` once unencrypted exfiltration is underway; partial because the clause is scoped to sensitive/identified data channels and does not address all protocol variants or post-exfiltration artifacts across every platform.
- T1052partialprevents — A.8.12 explicitly names portable storage devices as a channel to monitor and DLP tools can block writes to removable media, directly addressing the technique's primary vector; the remainder is air-gapped compromises and physical-access scenarios where endpoint DLP cannot reach, plus insider use of devices the control has not been configured to block.
- T1071partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools detect sensitive data being transmitted via application layer protocols (e.g., email, uploads to untrusted cloud services), which is one use of T1071, but the control is content-based and channel-scoped — it does not detect the C2 channel itself when no sensitive data is in transit, and T1071 is explicitly designed to blend with existing traffic, so the detection covers a slice rather than the technique.
- T1071.002partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly monitors file transfer channels and detects disclosure of sensitive information via those channels, so it can surface T1071.002 traffic that carries sensitive data; however, T1071.002 is primarily a C2 technique where much of the traffic is commands and results rather than sensitive content, and A.8.12's detection is scoped to sensitive-data disclosure rather than protocol-abuse generally, leaving a bounded remainder.
- T1074partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools identify and monitor sensitive information at risk of unauthorized disclosure, including in unstructured data on user systems, which can surface aggregation of sensitive files into a staging location; however, the clause's primary mechanism is egress monitoring (email, uploads, transfers) and internal consolidation through copying/archiving on the victim's own estate is largely outside that scope, so only a slice of staging activity is caught.
- T1074partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can block some staging vectors that traverse monitored channels (copy/paste to removable media, uploads to untrusted cloud services, email-based staging), but the core of T1074 — consolidating collected data into a central location on local disk, a network share, or an adversary-created cloud instance — is internal movement that DLP's channel-oriented monitoring does not reach, leaving a substantial remainder analogous to but larger than the one against T1048.
- T1074.001partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels of data leakage and detects disclosure of sensitive information, which can surface the accumulation of data in a staging location, but the control's detection scope is limited to monitored channels and classified data rather than all local file operations.
- T1074.001partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP mechanisms are primarily oriented to egress channels (email, file transfers, uploads, network transmissions) and the clause's guidance on monitoring 'unstructured data on a user's system' gives some endpoint visibility into unusual file consolidation, but local staging is an internal action on a compromised system that the clause's egress-focused mechanisms do not directly stop — the staging completes before any disclosure channel is engaged.
- T1074.002partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools monitor sensitive information at rest and in motion, which can surface aspects of staging (e.g., creation of archive files containing sensitive data, unusual consolidation of data from multiple sources onto one system), but the clause's primary detection mechanisms target the exfiltration channels (email, uploads to untrusted cloud, copy/paste) rather than internal data consolidation, so staging that does not yet touch a monitored egress channel is largely outside its scope.
- T1091partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage including portable storage devices and removable media, and using DLP tools to detect disclosure or exfiltration of sensitive information (including when copied or transferred), which surfaces the malware-copying or autorun-triggering action on removable media for most cases on Windows platforms.
- T1092partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly names portable storage devices as a monitored channel and DLP tools can detect file activity on removable media, but T1092 is fundamentally C2 command relay between compromised hosts rather than unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, so what DLP catches is incidental file-write/file-read activity on removable media rather than the technique's core mechanism.
- T1092partialprevents — A.8.12 explicitly names portable storage devices as a channel to monitor and can restrict users' ability to transfer data to removable media, which would impede the C2-via-removable-media channel; however, the control's purpose is preventing unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, not blocking command traffic between already-compromised systems, so the coverage is incidental rather than designed.
- T1102partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools explicitly detect disclosure of sensitive information to third-party cloud services and web services, which catches the data-exfiltration leg of T1102; the inbound C2 commands and the use of the web service as a relay channel itself carry no sensitive payload for the classifier to flag, so the technique's full mechanism is not observed.
- T1102.002partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels including web/cloud services for sensitive data disclosure, so it can detect data being exfiltrated through a T1102.002 web-service channel, but it does not detect the C2 mechanism itself — commands sent to the compromised system and non-data return traffic look like ordinary HTTPS to legitimate services and carry no sensitive-data pattern for DLP to match.
- T1113partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect some screen capture activity (e.g., monitoring for screen-capture API calls, detecting the resulting image file, or catching its subsequent transmission via email or cloud upload), but the control explicitly routes screenshot prevention to 'terms and conditions of use, training and auditing' rather than to DLP detection, so detection is incidental rather than the primary mechanism and coverage is partial.
- T1114partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly names email as a monitored channel and calls out detecting disclosure via email, so DLP tools surface most email-collection activity; the bounded remainder is passive reading from a compromised mail server or local mail store where no transmission crosses a monitored channel.
- T1114partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools monitor email as a leakage channel and can block forwarding rules or outbound transmissions that expose email content, but T1114's bulk — server-side collection via compromised credentials, webmail access, and local mail-store access — does not pass through a channel DLP instruments, so the technique runs and succeeds in most of its forms.
- T1114.001partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can identify and monitor sensitive information in unstructured data on a user's system (including .ost/.pst files), and may detect anomalous access to email stores containing sensitive content, but the control's primary mechanism targets exfiltration channels (email in transit, file transfers, cloud uploads) rather than local file access by an adversary, so detection of local email collection is incidental rather than designed-for.
- T1114.001partialprevents — A.8.12 can block the exfiltration of collected email data via monitored channels, but it does not prevent the adversary from accessing and collecting the local .ost/.pst files in the first place.
- T1114.002partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors email as a data leakage channel and can detect the disclosure of sensitive information via email, but remote email collection by an adversary using valid credentials may not trigger detection if the collection itself does not involve unauthorized disclosure outside monitored channels.
- T1114.003partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools monitor email channels and can detect sensitive content being forwarded to external recipients via inbox rules, but the technique is fundamentally about the rule itself — its creation, persistence, and hidden variants (MAPI-modified rules) — which DLP does not see; only the subset of forwarding rules that move content matching DLP classification triggers detection.
- T1114.003partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can monitor email channels, scan outgoing mail for sensitive content, and block or quarantine forwarding of identified sensitive data, which prevents a slice of T1114.003; however, hidden rules created via MAPI, rules forwarding all mail without content triggers, and admin-created transport rules evade content-based DLP, leaving a named remainder.
- T1115partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly addresses clipboard operations (preventing copy/paste, monitoring channels of data leakage) and DLP tools can monitor clipboard activity and detect when sensitive data is accessed via clipboard APIs, but detection depends on endpoint agent coverage and configured data classifiers, and an adversary's local process reading clipboard contents (clip.exe, Get-Clipboard, pbpaste) is a narrower signal than the network and email channels the clause primarily enumerates.
- T1115partialprevents — A.8.12 can prevent clipboard-based leakage by restricting copy-paste outside the organization, but the technique also collects data for in-memory use or exfiltration via other channels, and the control cannot block the clipboard itself without breaking legitimate local use.
- T1119partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors data leakage channels and detects disclosure of sensitive information, which can surface automated collection when it moves data across monitored boundaries, but the control's scope is exfiltration channels rather than internal collection activity, so it catches the subset that touches those channels and misses collection that stays within the estate.
- T1119partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can block the egress of collected data (quarantining emails, blocking uploads to untrusted cloud services, preventing copy/paste of sensitive data) and can identify sensitive information at rest to constrain what is exposed, but the collection itself — automated scripts reading files, querying databases, staging data locally — happens inside the system where DLP has limited visibility until data attempts to leave, so the technique's collection phase is largely not prevented.
- T1176.001partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools monitor channels of data leakage and can detect sensitive information being exfiltrated by a malicious extension through monitored channels (email, cloud uploads, HTTP), but they do not detect the extension installation itself, credentials stolen from form fields before transmission, or extension-based C2 that uses browser APIs outside DLP's content-inspection scope.
- T1176.002partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools detect sensitive data leaving through monitored channels (email, file transfers, cloud uploads), so exfiltration performed BY a malicious IDE extension through those channels is caught; the remainder is the technique itself — extension installation and execution, and exfiltration via channels outside A.8.12's monitoring scope (direct network connections, DNS, etc.) — which the clause does not see.
- T1213partialdetects — A.8.12 detects the external-sharing and disclosure facets of T1213 (e.g. abuse of repository sharing features to send sensitive documents outside the organization, or uploads of sensitive content via monitored channels), but its detection mechanisms are oriented to outbound leakage channels and disclosure events rather than to the internal repository-access and mining that constitute the bulk of the technique.
- T1213partialprevents — A.8.12 addresses the external-sharing and exfiltration facets of T1213 (monitoring channels, blocking uploads to untrusted services, restricting copy/paste) but does not prevent the core act of an authorized or compromised user reading data from within a repository like SharePoint or a CRM, which is the bulk of the technique.
- T1213.001partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors outbound channels (email, file transfers, uploads to untrusted services) and can detect exfiltration of data mined from Confluence, but it cannot detect the core act of reading/viewing data within the Confluence SaaS platform itself, which is the primary mechanism of T1213.001.
- T1213.002partialdetects — A.8.12's detection scope is egress channels (email, cloud upload, file transfer) and user actions that expose sensitive data (copy/paste, screenshots); it can detect downstream exfiltration of mined SharePoint content via monitored channels, but the core act of an adversary reading and mining the SharePoint repository is internal access that falls outside A.8.12's vantage point and would be surfaced by SharePoint audit logs and A.8.16 access monitoring instead.
- T1213.002partialprevents — A.8.12's mechanisms (classifying sensitive information, monitoring channels, blocking extraction actions like copying database entries) address parts of T1213.002 — particularly any step where the adversary copies or moves SharePoint content out — but the core of the technique is the adversary browsing and reading SharePoint repositories in place, which DLP controls do not directly prevent; access controls and repository hardening carry the primary prevention.
- T1213.003partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive data at risk, and detecting disclosures (e.g. uploads to untrusted cloud services or email), which surfaces adversary collection from internal/private code repositories when it crosses monitored vectors; it does not instrument the repository itself or all offline exfiltration methods, leaving a genuine slice uncovered.
- T1213.003partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can identify sensitive information in code repositories, detect when source code or credentials are being moved out through monitored channels, and block user actions that copy repository contents externally — but the technique's core is the adversary reading and collecting from within the repository itself, which DLP does not prevent, and repositories hosted on third-party sites (GitHub, GitLab, etc.) sit outside the organization's monitored DLP scope.
- T1213.004partialdetects — A.8.12's primary detection mechanisms focus on channels of data leakage (email, file transfers, uploads to untrusted cloud services) rather than access patterns within applications; CRM mining occurs inside the SaaS platform and is largely invisible to DLP unless the tool is specifically configured to monitor CRM access, which is not the clause's primary mechanism.
- T1213.004partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP mechanisms can block extraction of CRM data through monitored channels (email, file transfers, copy/paste restrictions) and classify CRM-held PII as sensitive, but the control does not prevent the adversary from querying and reading CRM data directly once they have obtained access — the core mining activity occurs inside the CRM system and is governed by access control, not by exfiltration-channel DLP.
- T1213.005partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect sensitive information appearing in messaging application content and flag anomalous data access or download patterns from these platforms, but the core technique — an adversary with access reading and mining chat history, source snippets, or credentials already resident in the messaging app — is largely invisible to DLP, which is oriented toward disclosure channels (email, uploads, transfers) rather than in-app data collection by an authorized-looking user.
- T1213.005partialprevents — A.8.12 can block the exfiltration of sensitive information through messaging applications via DLP tools that monitor and prevent unauthorized disclosures, but it cannot prevent the adversary from accessing and reading messages that are already present in the application.
- T1213.006partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive data at risk, and detecting its disclosure (e.g. uploads to untrusted clouds or email), which surfaces database mining and exfiltration in monitored environments; the remainder is unmonitored or internal adversary queries that evade the DLP scope.
- T1213.006partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP mechanisms (blocking copy/paste of database entries, monitoring uploads, quarantining sensitive data in transit) can prevent some of the data extraction that follows database mining, but the control does not prevent the adversary from querying the database itself, and does not cover all exfiltration channels — so the technique's execution is not stopped, only some of its output is.
- T1530partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect some instances of T1530 — particularly when extracted cloud data traverses monitored channels (email, file transfers, uploads to external services) or when CASB-like functionality surfaces anomalous cloud access — but the clause's primary mechanism targets data leaving via traditional channels and uploads to cloud services, not direct API access to cloud storage objects, so a meaningful slice of the technique (misconfiguration exploitation, credential-based access, direct object retrieval) falls outside its detection scope.
- T1534partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly monitors email as a data-leakage channel and can detect sensitive information being sent via email, which gives it incidental visibility into internal spearphishing emails — but its detection mechanism is oriented toward sensitive-data disclosure, not toward identifying phishing patterns, malicious attachments, or compromised-account anomalies, so it catches a slice rather than the technique.
- T1537partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels of data leakage and detects disclosure of sensitive information, but T1537's transfer to another account on the same cloud service blends into normal traffic and uses internal address space, so detection depends on whether the DLP tool is configured to monitor intra-cloud account activity rather than only external channels.
- T1537partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can be configured to monitor cloud API calls, block unauthorized sharing-link creation, and prevent data movement to unapproved cloud accounts, but T1537 is specifically designed to evade traditional DLP by using intra-provider APIs and internal address space that blend into normal traffic, leaving a substantial portion of the technique's surface unaddressed.
- T1552.004partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors channels of data leakage (email, file transfers, cloud uploads, portable storage) and can detect exfiltration of private key files via those channels, but it does not detect the core action of T1552.004 — searching for and acquiring private key files on a compromised system — which happens before any channel-based exfiltration and may never involve one if the keys are used in place.
- T1552.008partialdetects — A.8.12 DLP tools can be configured to scan chat channels (Slack, Teams, etc.) for credential patterns and detect users sharing API keys, passwords, or tokens in messages — a documented DLP use case that maps to the user-sharing portion of T1552.008. The remainder is the adversary-access vector: credentials read through admin portals, server-side access, or compromised integration tools (e.g., Slack Workflows) occur inside the service's own infrastructure, outside DLP's monitoring scope, so those paths are not surfaced.
- T1552.008partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP tools can monitor chat/collaboration channels and block credentials from being transmitted in messages, removing the precondition the technique relies on; however, the technique also covers adversaries accessing existing chat logs through compromised endpoints, admin portals, or integration tools, which DLP does not reach.
- T1560partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools identify and monitor sensitive information in unstructured data on user systems and can flag archive files containing sensitive content, but the clause's primary detection focus is on exfiltration channels (uploads, email) rather than the local compression/encryption step, and archives created on systems without endpoint agents or immediately moved off-host evade the mechanism.
- T1560.001partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect sensitive data being accessed and packaged into archives on a user's system (per the 'identify and monitor sensitive information at risk of unauthorized disclosure' clause), but the technique's core act — invoking tar/zip/7-Zip on collected data — is not what DLP instruments; detection is content-driven and depends on the DLP being configured to watch endpoint file operations and archive contents, leaving a bounded remainder where staging happens outside the monitored scope.
- T1560.002partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive data at risk, and using DLP tools to detect disclosure events (including exfiltration of collected data), which surfaces T1560.002 archiving of sensitive information prior to exfiltration; the remainder is library use that evades the specific monitoring or data-classification rules chosen by the implementer.
- T1567partialprevents — A.8.12 directly targets this technique — its text names uploads to untrusted third-party cloud services and email as examples, and DLP tools are meant to block such transmissions — but the control is content-aware and pattern-based, so encrypted payloads, unclassified data, novel encoding, and adversary use of services the DLP allow-lists leave a real remainder, matching the T1048 anchor on the same control.
- T1567.001partialdetects — A.8.12's DLP tools can detect exfiltration to code repositories by monitoring network transmissions and data uploads to untrusted services, but detection depends on the repository being within the monitored channel scope and the data being classified as sensitive, leaving a remainder where unmonitored channels or unclassified data escape detection.
- T1567.001partialprevents — A.8.12 explicitly targets disclosure to untrusted third-party cloud services and blocking transmissions that expose sensitive information, which is the shape of T1567.001; however, code repositories are often legitimate services already permitted for developer workflows, HTTPS limits content inspection, and adversaries can encode, chunk, or use authorized tokens to evade DLP, leaving a bounded remainder that matches the partial grade given to A.8.12 vs T1048.
- T1567.003partialdetects — A.8.12's monitoring of data leakage channels and detection of sensitive information disclosure to untrusted services can surface exfiltration to text storage sites, but the technique's use of encryption and legitimate-looking traffic to common developer platforms limits complete visibility.
- T1567.003partialprevents — A.8.12 explicitly names uploads to untrusted third-party cloud services and blocking user actions/network transmissions that expose sensitive information, which directly addresses exfiltration to text storage sites; however, DLP depends on content pattern matching and known destination lists, so encoded, encrypted, or chunked data and lesser-known paste sites evade it, leaving a meaningful remainder.
- T1567.003partialresponds — A.8.12 explicitly requires acting on detected leakage (quarantine, block transmissions, DLP tools that stop exfiltration) and names response to adversary intelligence actions (e.g. honeypots, disinformation); this bounds an in-progress exfil to a text site once underway, but the core of the control is still detection/prevention and the response slice is narrower than the full technique surface (e.g. post-exfil concealment via paid/encrypted paste services).
- T1567.004partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly monitors channels and detects disclosure of sensitive information, so it can identify sensitive data posted to webhook endpoints, but HTTPS encryption and legitimate SaaS blending leave meaningful exfiltration over webhooks undetected unless endpoint or TLS-inspection controls are also in place.
- T1567.004partialprevents — A.8.12 DLP can block webhook exfiltration when content inspection catches sensitive data patterns or when destinations are blocklisted, but HTTPS encryption to legitimate SaaS endpoints (Discord, Slack, etc.) is specifically designed to evade DLP, leaving a substantial slice that the control cannot prevent — matching the partial grade on the T1048 anchor.
- T1572partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage (email, file transfers, network transmissions) and using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information, which surfaces protocol tunneling when it carries or exfiltrates identifiable sensitive data; the remainder is tunneling that does not transit monitored channels or carry detectable sensitive payloads.
- T1589partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive information at risk, and detecting its disclosure (e.g. via email, uploads, or exfiltration), which surfaces some forms of identity gathering such as leaks or active probing that expose data; it does not cover passive OSINT, social media scraping, or pre-leak reconnaissance that never touches monitored channels.
- T1589partialprevents — A.8.12 prevents leakage of identity information held inside the organization (employee directories, HR data, contact lists) via email, file transfer, and upload channels, but T1589's primary sources — social media, public victim-owned websites, third-party breaches, and active probing of authentication services — sit outside A.8.12's reach, so only a slice of the technique's information space is closed.
- T1598partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors email and other channels for sensitive information disclosure, which can surface phishing-for-information messages that solicit data, but the technique's social engineering core—the victim's decision to reply—occurs outside the control's monitoring scope, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1598partialprevents — A.8.12 monitors email and other channels for sensitive data leaving the organization and can block transmissions containing that data, which prevents the disclosure of structured sensitive information elicited by phishing-for-information emails; however, the technique is not fully prevented because not all elicited information (credentials, network details, conversational disclosures) is structured data DLP can pattern-match, and not all phishing-for-information channels (phone calls, IM, in-person) are within DLP's email/file-transfer scope.
- T1598.002partialprevents — A.8.12 monitors outbound channels (email, file transfers) and can block transmission of sensitive information, which prevents the SUCCESS of the elicitation step — the response carrying the harvested data back to the adversary — but it does not stop the inbound spearphishing message from arriving or the user from being socially engineered into filling in the attachment, so the technique still runs.
- T1598.003partialdetects — A.8.12 monitors email and file transfers for sensitive information disclosure, which can detect the outbound click or the subsequent exfiltration of credentials, but the technique's initial delivery and the user's interaction with the link occur before the DLP tool's monitoring scope engages, leaving a significant portion of the technique unobserved.
- T1602partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels of data leakage, using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including when uploaded or transmitted), and acting on it; configuration repositories on network devices are a named vector for bulk sensitive administrative data that aligns with the control's scope for identifying, monitoring and detecting unauthorized extraction or disclosure.
- T1619partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels and using DLP tools to detect disclosure of sensitive information (including to untrusted cloud services), which surfaces T1619 when it involves exfiltration-oriented enumeration of cloud objects; this is a genuine but minority slice of the technique's full discovery surface (API-driven enumeration for shaping behaviors, not always tied to leakage).
- T1681partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, identifying sensitive information at risk, and detecting its disclosure (including to untrusted services), which surfaces an adversary searching threat-vendor data about their own campaigns when that data contains or leaks organization-controlled indicators.
- T1684partialprevents — A.8.12's DLP mechanisms (email quarantine, blocking copy/paste, monitoring uploads) prevent some outcomes of social engineering — specifically unauthorized data disclosure via monitored channels — but the social engineering itself still occurs (the user is still deceived), and many T1684 outcomes (password resets, MFA changes, financial approvals, payload execution, voice/help-desk vectors) fall entirely outside A.8.12's scope.
- T1700partialprevents — A.8.12's channel monitoring, DLP detection of sensitive disclosures, and blocking of transmissions apply to the data-movement step of AI-enabled exfiltration (email, web uploads, file transfers), but the AI agent's sanctioned tool connections can use channels or patterns that bypass DLP rules, and the clause does not address prompt injection or agent behavior, leaving a meaningful remainder.
- T1700partialdetects — A.8.12 explicitly detects disclosure of sensitive information through monitored channels (email, cloud uploads, file transfers), and AI-enabled exfiltration ultimately moves data through these same channels, so DLP tools would surface the outbound transfer; however, the technique abuses sanctioned AI agent tools and authorized credentials, and the data movement may traverse APIs or services outside the DLP's monitored set, leaving a bounded remainder the control does not see.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (8)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A09partialfinds — A.8.12 explicitly requires monitoring channels, detecting disclosures (e.g. uploads/emails), and using DLP tools to identify sensitive data at risk, which surfaces logging/alerting gaps when they enable undetected leakage.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.