Raw vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NSummary
CVE-2026-42592 is a medium-severity Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (CWE-367) vulnerability in Thecodingmachine Gotenberg. Its CVSS base score is 5.3 (Medium).
Operationally, exploitation aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190); ranked at the 9th percentile by exploit likelihood (below the median); it is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog; a public proof-of-concept is referenced.
The strongest mitigations our analysis identified map to AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement) and SC-7 (Boundary Protection) — see the control section below for these in your framework.
OWASP Top 10 for Web (2025)
EU & UK References
- 🇪🇺 ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-30315
Vulnerability Data
Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS…
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resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
- CWE(s)
Related Threats
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI
Why these techniques?
DNS rebinding bypass enables SSRF against internal services via the public Gotenberg API (CWE-918).
CVEs Like This One
Affected Assets
Mitigating Controls
Control response
Mitigating Controls (NIST 800-53 r5) AI
Enforces information flow policies on outbound URLs so that resolved addresses (public vs. private) are consistently validated before any network connection is permitted, directly blocking the DNS-rebinding SSRF.
Boundary-protection mechanisms (e.g., egress filtering, proxy gateways) can deny connections to private/internal address ranges regardless of DNS timing, closing the window exploited by Gotenberg's FilterOutboundURL.
Requires rigorous validation of URL inputs that includes atomic resolution and binding of the final IP address used by Chromium, eliminating the TOCTOU race described in CWE-367.
Mitigating Controls (NIST CSF 2.0) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→CSF cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Secure SDLC practices directly include coding standards and reviews that prevent TOCTOU race conditions.
Runtime monitoring of web applications and services can detect anomalous outbound requests indicative of SSRF.
Vulnerability identification processes can discover and record SSRF flaws in web applications.
Network segmentation and egress controls can limit the damage from successful SSRF requests.
Mitigating Controls (ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A) AI
Derived directly from the weakness types (CWEs) cited in the NVD entry via our AI-authored CWE→ISO cross-walk (authority under review) — links open the control.
Operational threat data describing SSRF campaigns can be used to tighten outbound-request allow-lists and detection rules before attackers exploit them.
Reliable, synchronized time across systems narrows the exploitable window in which a resource state can change between a security check and its use.