A.5.18 Organizational
Access rights
Structured attributes from ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — control type · CIA properties · cybersecurity concept · operational capability · security domain. What do these mean?
Mapped NIST 800-53 r5 controls (21)
Our reading (mostly llm_verified) of how this ISO control and each NIST 800-53 control relate. Not an ISO or NIST product.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- AC-2mostlycovers — A.5.18's requirement to define and authorize access rights according to business needs accounts for the bulk of ac-2's account provisioning, types, privileges, and approval elements, but leaves a residual on ac-2's explicit prohibitions, account-manager assignment, and group/role mechanics not required by the ISO control.
- AC-3mostlycovers — A.5.18's definition and authorization of access rights according to business requirements accounts for the bulk of AC-3's enforcement of approved authorizations per policy, but leaves a residual on the actual runtime enforcement mechanism itself
- AC-6mostlycovers — A.5.18's broad mandate to define and authorize access rights according to business requirements accounts for the bulk of AC-6's least-privilege rule (authorized accesses must be necessary), but leaves a residual of explicit least-privilege enforcement mechanisms and ongoing review that sit outside A.5.18's wording.
- AC-5partialcovers — A.5.18's broad requirement to define and authorize access rights according to business needs accounts for only a slice of ac-5 (the 'define system access authorizations' part), but does not address identifying/documenting the separation-of-duties policy or the specific SoD analysis that drives those authorizations.
Aligned NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes (13)
NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes this ISO control aligns with — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- PR.AA-05fullcovers — The ISO control's detailed provisioning, review, and revocation procedures directly implement the CSF outcome of defining, managing, enforcing, and reviewing access permissions and authorizations.
- PR.AA-01domain mandateimplements — A.5.18 operationalizes identity/credential management within the access-rights domain that PR.AA-01 names, but the outcome does not cite access-rights definition explicitly
Related OWASP ASVS 5.0 requirements (13)
Application-security verification requirements (OWASP ASVS 5.0) this ISO control aligns with; links open the ASVS chapter. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified) — many ISO controls have no ASVS counterpart.
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Related weaknesses / CWE (2550)
Weakness classes this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- CWE-250mostlyblocks — Requiring explicit justification and time-limited grants discourages the routine allocation of unnecessary privileges that would otherwise allow execution with more rights than required.
- CWE-921mostlyblocks — Granting and reviewing access rights prevents unauthorized access to sensitive data on storage media.
- CWE-1268partialblocks — Directly governs the assignment and review of access rights, addressing inconsistent privilege mappings between agents.
- CWE-268partialblocks — A.5.18's segregation-of-duties requirement (item c) and its review of privileged access rights address a slice of privilege chaining where the dangerous combination is in the granted access rights themselves, but most CWE-268 instances arise from application-level logic and runtime role interactions (e.g., the OPERATOR-resets-Admin-password pattern) that the provisioning/revocation lifecycle does not reach.
- CWE-274partialblocks — Access-rights provisioning and review reduce privilege gaps, yet do not address the software’s failure to handle insufficient privileges gracefully.
- CWE-278partialblocks — Managing access rights includes reviewing and adjusting permissions when objects are copied or inherited.
- CWE-288partialblocks — Access rights provisioning and review prevent bypass via unmonitored or alternate channels.
- CWE-408partialblocks — Access rights provisioning can restrict expensive operations until authorization is granted.
- CWE-424partialblocks — Managing access rights must cover every alternate path that could bypass intended restrictions.
- CWE-528partialblocks — Granting only the minimum rights needed can prevent unauthorized access to core dumps, but does not address how or where they are generated.
- CWE-552partialprevents — Graded partial by the owner: this user access lifecycle clause does not address cases where access groups and roles are not well defined, nor cases where user access provisioning is not normally applied, such as file permissions on a web server.
- CWE-639partialblocks — Managing access rights includes ensuring users can only access their own records and not bypass authorization by altering identifiers.
- CWE-708partialblocks — Access-rights provisioning includes ownership assignment; fixing CWE-708 directly supports this control's intent.
- CWE-842partialremoves — A.5.18 governs the provisioning and revocation of access rights, not the correctness of group membership assignments; it removes access when roles change but does not correct a user already placed in the wrong group.
- CWE-842partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization (a), policy verification (f), and segregation of duties (c) prevent the administrative path of placing a user into an incorrect group during provisioning, but the weakness's Implementation-phase mode of introduction (product bugs that assign users to wrong groups, as in most observed CVEs) is outside the clause's reach.
Mitigated MITRE ATT&CK techniques (2715)
Adversary techniques (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise) this ISO control helps mitigate; links open attack.mitre.org. Our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- T1078mostlyprevents — Strict authorization, timely revocation on role change or departure, and central logging of access rights directly limit an adversary’s ability to retain or abuse valid accounts after employment ends or privileges are altered.
- T1078.002mostlyprevents — Enforcing segregation of duties and periodic reviews of privileged domain accounts makes it harder for attackers to maintain long-term access via compromised domain credentials.
- T1098mostlyprevents — Requiring documented approval and maintaining a central record of access-right changes makes unauthorized account manipulation or privilege additions more detectable and harder to sustain.
- T1136mostlyprevents — Authorization workflows and separation of duties reduce the likelihood that an adversary can create new local, domain, or cloud accounts without detection.
- T1136.001mostlyprevents — Requiring documented approval before any new local account is provisioned makes covert creation of local accounts for persistence significantly harder.
- T1003.006partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning rules, segregation of duties, and review of privileged access rights constrain who holds the Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin / DC computer-account memberships DCSync requires, shrinking the set of identities that can run it; but the control governs the lifecycle of granted access, not the abuse of legitimately held privileges, so an account that already has those rights — or one compromised to obtain them — can still execute DCSync.
- T1021partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so proper implementation removes stale accounts, restricts who holds remote-access permissions, and limits privileged lateral-movement paths — measurably shrinking the set of valid credentials an adversary can ride into T1021. It does not reach `mostly` because the clause is procedural and does not itself enforce authentication strength or block remote protocols; many identities legitimately retain remote access, and an adversary holding any one of those valid credentials can still execute the technique.
- T1021.001partialprevents — A.5.18 manages who is granted access and revokes it when no longer needed, which constrains the pool of accounts that can legitimately use RDP and can deny RDP rights to accounts that shouldn't have them; however, the technique still runs against any valid account that retains access, and A.5.18 does not stop credential theft, the RDP service from being available, or the technique from executing with legitimately-held credentials.
- T1021.002partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who holds access rights and ensures privileged access is restricted, reviewed, and revoked when no longer needed — so an adversary without properly authorized credentials cannot reach admin shares, and dormant or stale accounts are removed before abuse. But the technique runs on any valid account with SMB access, and A.5.18 does not stop the protocol, does not authenticate the user (A.8.5's lane), and cannot prevent abuse of legitimately provisioned admin credentials or stolen hashes; the remainder is the technique itself executing whenever valid credentials exist.
- T1021.003partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so it can prevent the technique where it removes or restricts accounts that should not exist or should not hold the privileged access DCOM requires (e.g. timely revocation on role change or termination, segregation of duties, privileged-rights review). It does not prevent the technique when an adversary operates from a legitimately provisioned account with the access the clause itself authorised, and it does not address the Registry ACLs on COM objects that gate remote activation.
- T1021.004partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who is granted SSH access through authorization, segregation of duties, timely revocation and review, so unauthorized identities cannot reach SSH — but the technique explicitly uses valid (authorized) accounts, and A.5.18 does not remove SSH itself or stop an authorized credential from being used; it manages the authorization layer, not the technique's execution.
- T1021.005partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so it can prevent some instances of T1021.005 by removing stale or unauthorized VNC access, limiting who is granted remote-control rights, and reviewing privileged access — but the technique specifically uses valid, legitimately-provisioned accounts, and A.5.18 is a process control over authorization rather than a mechanism that stops an authorized session from being abused, so it cannot prevent the technique when valid credentials are in play.
- T1021.006partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so it can constrain which identities are granted remote-access privileges and ensure terminated or changed-role accounts lose them — preventing a slice of T1021.006 by limiting the population of accounts that can use WinRM. It does not disable the WinRM service, segment the network, or stop an adversary who already holds valid, currently-authorized credentials from using it, so the prevention is partial rather than mostly or full.
- T1021.007partialprevents — A.5.18 requires access rights to be provisioned only after authorization, reviewed after role changes, and removed upon termination, which prevents the adversary from using accounts that should no longer exist or have excessive privileges, but it does not prevent misuse of valid accounts that remain properly authorized for cloud services.
- T1021.008partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so a well-implemented regime limits who holds valid cloud VM access and removes it when no longer needed, shrinking the set of accounts an adversary can ride. It does not, however, prevent the use of legitimately granted valid accounts — the technique's own prerequisite — so the reduction is a slice of the attack surface rather than a closure.
- T1037.003partialprevents — A.5.18 governs the provisioning and revocation of access rights, so where it removes the adversary's ability to write or modify network logon scripts the technique cannot be established, but the control does not prevent a user with legitimate script-modification rights from abusing them.
- T1039partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so where it is properly implemented a compromised account is less likely to hold unnecessary access to network shares containing sensitive data — the technique fails for want of authorized access. The extent is partial because the control is a management process rather than a technical enforcement mechanism (that lives in A.5.15/A.8.3), and where the compromised identity legitimately holds access to the share the technique still succeeds.
- T1053.002partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted the privileges the `at` utility requires (local Administrators on Windows, superuser or `at.allow` membership on Linux/macOS), so a properly implemented provisioning and review process prevents unauthorized identities from invoking it; however, the clause is a process control over access rights and does not directly restrict the `at` binary, `at.allow`/`at.deny` configuration, or the Task Scheduler service, and it cannot stop an authorized administrator from abusing the utility, leaving a named remainder.
- T1053.005partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds the privileges needed to create scheduled tasks through authorization, segregation of duties, and timely revocation, shrinking the set of identities that can run T1053.005; but it is a procedural control over access provisioning and does not directly block the technique, so any identity that legitimately retains the privilege (or has compromised one) can still abuse Task Scheduler.
- T1053.007partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted access rights to create container orchestration jobs through authorization, segregation of duties, and review of privileged access, which constrains unauthorized identities from scheduling CronJobs; however, it is a process/governance control that does not remove the scheduling functionality itself, and authorized users or compromised credentials can still execute the technique.
- T1059.008partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted access to network device CLIs through provisioning, authorization, and review, so it prevents unauthorized identities from reaching the interpreter; however, it does not constrain what an authorized user can execute once authenticated, nor does it address exploitation of the CLI itself, leaving the technique reachable by anyone with valid access.
- T1059.009partialprevents — A.5.18 governs the provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so proper implementation (least privilege, segregation of duties, timely removal, regular review of privileged access) constrains the permissions a compromised identity carries into cloud API abuse — but the technique still runs against whatever permissions the identity holds, and A.5.18 is a governance/provisioning control whose enforcement depends on A.8.3/A.8.5, so it reduces the attack surface without preventing the technique from executing.
- T1059.012partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so it constrains who can reach the hypervisor management plane and use esxcli/vim-cmd; however, it does not stop the technique from running once an identity with access is compromised or abused, and it sets requirements rather than mandating authentication strength, leaving a named remainder of credential theft and insider misuse.
- T1059.013partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is authorized to use container management interfaces (Docker CLI, Kubernetes API, kubectl), so proper provisioning, segregation, and review of those access rights prevents unauthorized identities from executing the technique; however, it does not prevent authorized users from abusing their access, does not stop credential compromise, and does not remove the tools themselves, leaving a substantial remainder that other controls (least functionality, authentication, network segmentation) must address.
- T1072partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who is granted access to powerful deployment systems (SCCM, Intune, etc.) through authorization, least privilege, segregation of duties, and regular review, shrinking the pool of identities that can abuse them; but the tools must be administered, authorized administrators retain the access the technique needs, and compromised legitimate credentials still satisfy the access check, so the technique is reduced rather than prevented.
- T1078.003partialprevents — Mandatory revocation of local accounts when users leave or change roles shrinks the pool of stale local credentials an attacker could leverage.
- T1078.004partialprevents — A.5.18 reduces the attack surface through proper provisioning authorization, timely revocation upon termination/role change, and regular reviews of privileged access, which prevents some instances (orphaned accounts, over-privileged standing access); but it does not stop an adversary who has obtained valid cloud credentials from using them, so the technique still runs against well-managed accounts.
- T1080partialprevents — A.5.18 restricts who can write to shared storage locations by requiring authorization for access rights, which limits the population able to taint shared content; however, it does not prevent the technique when authorized accounts are compromised or when write access is broadly granted (as is typical for network drives), and it does not address content integrity verification.
- T1083partialprevents — A.5.18 limits access to files and directories according to authorization so it blocks discovery of resources outside the granted set, but any legitimate identity can still enumerate the files and directories it is allowed to access, so the technique is only partly prevented.
- T1087.004partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights; it does not prevent an authenticated identity from running enumeration commands like `az ad user list` or `aws iam list-users`. The technique runs once access exists, and access-rights management constrains who has access, not what they enumerate once authenticated.
- T1098.002partialdetects — A.5.18 can surface unauthorized mailbox delegate permissions through its required access-rights records and periodic reviews, but only at review time and only where email delegation is in the reviewed access scope, so detection is partial.
- T1098.002partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization requirement, segregation of duties (separating approval from implementation), and periodic review of access rights constrain who can grant mailbox permissions and create an audit trail, but the control governs the legitimate provisioning process rather than blocking an adversary who has compromised an account with sufficient privilege to authorize changes; the review is periodic, not real-time, so grants made by a privileged adversary can persist until the next review cycle.
- T1098.003partialprevents — A.5.18's segregation of duties (separating approval from implementation), authorization requirements, and regular review of privileged access rights constrain an adversary from unilaterally adding cloud roles through the legitimate provisioning process, but the technique operates via direct cloud IAM API calls (e.g., CreatePolicyVersion, AttachUserPolicy) that an adversary with sufficient compromised permissions can execute outside the organization's provisioning workflow, so the prevention is a slice rather than a closure.
- T1098.005partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization requirement (a), verification of access level (f), and central record-keeping (h, k) can constrain unauthorized device registration in MFA/IdP systems when treated as access rights, but the clause does not specifically address MFA self-enrollment or device management registration, and the technique commonly exploits self-service flows that bypass the provisioning authorization workflow.
- T1098.006partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization requirement (a), segregation of duties (c), and review processes constrain who may grant access rights and provide a check against unauthorized additions, which applies to container cluster role bindings if the provisioning process covers them; however, the technique explicitly assumes the adversary already holds sufficient permissions to create RoleBindings or modify ABAC policies, and A.5.18 is a general access-management process rather than a control specific to container orchestration, so the prevention is a slice of the attack surface rather than a closure.
- T1112partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds rights to modify the registry through provisioning, review and least-privilege authorization, so non-administrators and unauthorized identities cannot perform T1112; however, any account legitimately granted registry-write rights (including a compromised administrator or service account) can still execute the technique, so the control reduces the surface without preventing the action.
- T1114.002partialprevents — A.5.18 prevents some instances of T1114.002 by revoking access of terminated users, limiting who has mail access, and reviewing privileged rights, but it does not stop an adversary using currently valid credentials (obtained via phishing, guessing, or theft) to access mail they are authorized to access — the technique's core mechanism runs unimpeded.
- T1133partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so it constrains who is authorized to use external remote services and ensures timely removal — a real slice of T1133. It does not, however, prevent credential theft/pharming that yields valid accounts, does not address exposed services that require no authentication (Docker/K8s APIs, Tor hidden services), and does not stop the remote services from existing; the technique's other vectors remain reachable.
- T1136.002partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization requirements, segregation of approval/implementation roles, and review of privileged access rights constrain who can legitimately provision accounts, but an attacker with sufficient compromised privileges (e.g., domain admin) can bypass the provisioning process and create accounts directly via `net user /add /domain`, so the technique is not prevented.
- T1136.003partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning process requires owner authorization before access rights are granted, which constrains unauthorized cloud account creation when properly enforced; however, the control is procedural and does not prevent account creation by an adversary who already holds sufficient privileges (e.g., a compromised admin) or who creates accounts through APIs and self-service paths that bypass the formal authorization workflow, leaving a named remainder rather than a near-complete mechanism.
- T1199partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains the scope, duration and review cadence of third-party access (least privilege, time-limited grants, segregation, periodic review), which limits what an adversary can reach once a partner is compromised, but it does not stop the third party from being breached in the first place nor prevent the adversary from using the legitimate credentials that exist by design of the trusted relationship.
- T1213partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning and review processes ensure access rights are granted only to authorized users and removed when no longer needed, which prevents unauthorized access to information repositories, but it does not address misconfigured repositories that are unintentionally left open to overly-broad or public access.
- T1213.001partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning and review of access rights, which constrains who can reach Confluence and reduces the attack surface (fewer stale or over-privileged accounts to compromise, regular review catches drift), but it does not stop an adversary who has compromised a legitimate account, who exploits a Confluence vulnerability, or who is an authorized user mining data — the technique runs whenever access is held, so the control shapes the conditions under which it can succeed rather than preventing it.
- T1213.002partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning, review and least-privileve requirements constrain which identities can reach sensitive SharePoint content, so a properly governed estate denies the adversary access to the high-value material the technique targets; however, the technique itself — browsing whatever SharePoint content a compromised identity can see — still runs, and excessive permissions, unreviewed role changes, and broad default grants leave a meaningful remainder where the browse succeeds.
- T1213.003partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains the population of identities that can reach code repositories — removing stale access, reviewing privileged rights, and enforcing least privilege — which shrinks the attack surface, but it cannot prevent data collection by any adversary who has compromised an authorized user's credentials, since the technique runs against identities the control itself has granted access to.
- T1213.004partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so least-privilege enforcement and regular reviews reduce the population of accounts that can reach CRM data and shrink what each compromised identity can read; however, once an adversary has valid credentials for a CRM-capable account, A.5.18 does not stop them from querying the system, so the technique still runs against any identity the control authorised.
- T1213.006partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning, least-privilege, segregation-of-duties and privileged-access-review requirements can prevent unauthorized identities from reaching sensitive databases and can scope what any single identity can read, but the technique typically runs under valid (often compromised) credentials that A.5.18 has already authorised, so it does not prevent the querying itself.
- T1484.001partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who is granted write access to GPOs through owner authorization, segregation of duties, and regular review of privileged rights, so unauthorized identities cannot perform the technique; however, it does not prevent the technique from being executed by any account that legitimately holds GPO write access — including compromised domain admin or delegated accounts — so the prevention is real but bounded to the unauthorized-access slice.
- T1485partialprevents — A.5.18 prevents unauthorized data destruction by restricting who has access to systems and data, but it does not prevent destruction by authorized users (including adversaries using valid credentials, which T1485 explicitly leverages for propagation) or by malware operating under compromised legitimate access — the technique still runs whenever the actor has the access rights the clause grants.
- T1485.001partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning, authorization, segregation-of-duties, and privileged-access review processes constrain who can hold the permissions (e.g., PutLifecycleConfiguration) the technique requires, shrinking the attack surface; but the control is a process that governs how rights are granted and reviewed, not a mechanism that blocks the API call itself, so an authorized user who is compromised or goes rogue, or an over-granted permission that survives review, can still execute the technique.
- T1489partialprevents — A.5.18 can prevent service-stop actions by ensuring only authorized identities hold the rights needed to stop or disable services and by revoking unneeded or leaver access, but it cannot stop an adversary who has compromised an authorized account or gained execution through an exploit from stopping services, so the protection is partial.
- T1491partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds modify rights to visual content and removes stale access (former employees, role changes), which closes insider and orphaned-credential vectors for defacement; however, it is a lifecycle/governance control over authorized access and does not stop an attacker who exploits a web application vulnerability, uses stolen credentials, or otherwise gains write access through means outside the provisioning process, so the technique still runs through those paths.
- T1495partialprevents — A.5.18 restricts who holds the privileged access required to write to firmware, so unauthorized identities cannot perform the corruption; however, the technique remains reachable via authorized insiders, compromised privileged accounts, and exploits that escalate to firmware-write capability, none of which access-rights provisioning addresses.
- T1496.004partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains the access surface through least-privilege provisioning, segregation of duties, and timely revocation, which limits what a compromised identity can abuse in SaaS environments; however, it does not prevent the initial credential compromise or the abuse of legitimately granted access to services the victim is already using, so the technique can still run within whatever access the compromised identity retains.
- T1505partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who may install or modify server components by requiring authorization, segregation of duties, and review of privileged access, which blocks the unauthorized-installer variant of T1505; however, the technique specifically abuses legitimate extensible development features granted to authorized users (developers, admins), and access-rights management grants rather than polices the use of those legitimate capabilities, so the abuse path remains open.
- T1505.006partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted privileged access to ESXi and requires authorization, review and segregation of duties around that access, which constrains the population able to install VIBs; however, it does not prevent an authorized privileged user from installing a malicious VIB, so the technique remains executable by anyone holding the requisite rights.
- T1525partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds permissions to modify or push images in a registry, so an adversary without those rights cannot implant a backdoored image; but the control governs authorization rather than the action itself, and a compromised authorized identity retains the capability, leaving the technique reachable through credential abuse.
- T1526partialprevents — A.5.18's least-privilege provisioning and review can prevent unauthorized identities from having any access to enumerate cloud services, and can scope what an authorized identity can discover, but it does not stop enumeration itself by any identity that already holds valid access — the technique runs and yields whatever that access permits.
- T1530partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning authorization, segregation of duties, and regular review of access rights prevent the granting of overly-broad or unauthorized access to cloud storage, but it does not prevent adversaries from using stolen/leaked credentials, exploiting misconfigurations that bypass the provisioning process, or accessing data via anonymous/public access that circumvents IAM entirely.
- T1537partialprevents — A.5.18's least-privilege provisioning, segregation of duties, and access review constrain what data a compromised identity can reach, so the transfer yields less than it would otherwise; the technique still runs and transfers whatever the identity can access, so this is a constraint on the technique's effectiveness rather than prevention of it.
- T1538partialprevents — A.5.18 prevents some instances of T1538 by removing access for terminated users, scoping access appropriately, and reviewing privileged access rights, but it does not prevent the use of valid, current stolen credentials to access a cloud dashboard — credential theft and authentication strength are outside its scope.
- T1543.002partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted privileged access (e.g., root) needed to write system-level systemd unit files in `/etc/systemd/system`, so proper provisioning and review of access rights constrains unauthorized persistence at that level; however, user-level systemd services in `$HOME/.config/systemd/user` require only standard user access which A.5.18 does not restrict, and the clause addresses access to information and assets rather than the persistence mechanism itself, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1543.003partialprevents — A.5.18 governs the provisioning, review and revocation of access rights including privileged rights, which constrains who holds the authority to create or modify Windows services; by limiting and regularly reviewing privileged access it reduces the population that can execute T1543.003, but it does not stop the technique when an adversary has obtained valid privileged credentials through other means (credential theft, exploitation), so the prevention is a slice rather than a closure.
- T1543.005partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning and review of access rights, so restricting who can invoke container management tools (docker, podman, kubelet) prevents unauthorized adversaries from creating or modifying container services; however, the control is a general access-rights process that does not specifically target container tooling, leaves authorized users (e.g., developers with rootful docker) able to abuse their granted access, and depends on faithful implementation rather than mandating a mechanism that blocks the technique itself.
- T1547.005partialprevents — A.5.18 reduces unauthorized or stale privileged access that T1547.005 needs to modify LSA registry keys, but it cannot stop an adversary already operating with authorized or compromised administrative rights.
- T1547.012partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning rules require authorization and review, which can block the initial installation of a malicious print processor DLL, but the control does not prevent an adversary with already-elevated privileges from bypassing the process or exploiting a misconfiguration.
- T1548partialprevents — A.5.18 governs the provisioning and review of access rights, which can prevent an adversary from obtaining the initial privileges that T1548 abuses, but it does not address the technical mechanisms that are bypassed once a user is already on the system.
- T1548.003partialprevents — A.5.18 governs authorization and regular review of privileged access rights (sudoers entries are access rights), which constrains the configurations that enable sudo abuse, but it is a management process control that does not directly prevent the sudo mechanism from executing or address sudo caching/tty_tickets configurations, so the technique can still run against any valid sudoers entry.
- T1548.005partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization requirements (a, g), segregation of duties (c), time-limited temporary access (e), and review of privileged access rights constrain some abuse vectors by requiring proper approval and periodic review of elevated permissions, but the technique exploits misconfigured cloud IAM features (JIT, impersonation, PassRole) that exist independently of the provisioning process, so a misconfigured grant or a compromised authorized account bypasses the control.
- T1552.007partialprevents — A.5.18 governs authorization and least-privilege for access to resources including container APIs, so properly scoped service accounts and reviewed privileged rights can deny the 'sufficient permissions' the technique requires; but the clause authenticates nothing and does not stop an adversary who has compromised an authorized identity, so the prevention is a constraint on who may access the APIs rather than a closure of the technique.
- T1555.006partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted access to retrieve secrets (authorization, segregation of duties, review of privileged access rights), which constrains the population of identities that could be abused to call the secrets manager API, but it adds no technical barrier to the API call itself — once an adversary has compromised a legitimately authorized identity, A.5.18 does not prevent the retrieval.
- T1564.002partialdetects — A.5.18 requires maintaining a central record of access rights and periodic review of those rights; comparing that record against actual system accounts can surface unauthorized hidden users, but the review is periodic and administrative rather than real-time detection, and the control does not mandate active monitoring for account-creation anomalies.
- T1565partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who can access data and what they can do, blocking unauthorized manipulation, but authorized users can still manipulate data within their legitimate scope and adversaries with compromised credentials bypass the control entirely.
- T1565.001partialprevents — A.5.18 restricts who can access information assets through provisioning, review and revocation, so an adversary without authorized access cannot reach the data to manipulate it; however, authorized users can still misuse their access, compromised credentials bypass the provisioning process, and the control governs the access-granting lifecycle rather than data integrity itself, leaving a substantial remainder.
- T1569partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who may access systems and create or modify services through authorization, segregation of duties, and review of privileged rights, which prevents unauthorized actors from abusing services; however, it does not remove the services themselves or stop adversaries who hold valid (or compromised) credentials within their authorized scope from abusing them, so the prevention is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1569.002partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds service-management privileges through provisioning, least-privilege and review, so non-administrative identities cannot reach services.exe / sc.exe / PsExec — but the technique requires privileges that some identities must legitimately hold (sysadmins, service accounts), and A.5.18 does not stop those authorized identities from abusing the rights they were granted.
- T1570partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains lateral tool transfer by enforcing least privilege, segregation of duties, and timely revocation of access rights, limiting which compromised identities can reach multiple systems; however, it does not remove the file-transfer capability itself, and where an adversary holds legitimately authorized access to source and destination systems the technique still runs.
- T1574.011partialprevents — A.5.18 mandates proper access rights management — authorization, review, and recording of access to information and associated assets — which, if well-implemented, would include setting appropriate ACLs on service registry keys and reviewing privileged access to them. However, it is a process/governance control that requires technical implementation to actually enforce permissions; the technique exploits a specific technical weakness (registry ACL misconfiguration) that A.5.18 addresses only at the procedural level, so prevention depends on the organization translating the process into concrete registry permissions.
- T1578partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights; properly scoped entitlements and segregation of duties limit which identities can modify compute infrastructure, so a compromised account without those permissions cannot run the technique. But A.5.18 is the management process — the technical enforcement of those rights lives in A.8.2/A.8.3 — and an adversary who has compromised an identity that legitimately holds the necessary permissions can still execute T1578.
- T1578.001partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning and review controls (authorization from asset owners, segregation of duties, regular review of privileged rights, removal of unneeded access) can restrict who is granted snapshot-creation permissions in the first place, but the control governs the granting process rather than enforcing technical restrictions at use-time, so an adversary with already-authorized or compromised credentials holding those rights still executes the technique.
- T1578.002partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so a well-implemented regime restricts which identities hold the cloud permissions needed to create instances — preventing the technique for unauthorized actors. It is partial because the clause is a process/governance layer: if the adversary already holds authorized credentials with instance-creation rights (e.g., a developer or compromised service account), the technique still runs, and the technical enforcement lives in IAM/SCP implementations downstream of this clause.
- T1578.003partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds the privileged rights needed to delete cloud instances through segregation of duties, authorization requirements, and review of privileged access rights, but it does not prevent an adversary who has compromised valid credentials with delete permissions from executing the technique, and it does not address credential compromise itself.
- T1580partialprevents — A.5.18's least-privilege provisioning and review constrain what a compromised identity is authorized to enumerate, so the adversary cannot discover resources outside that scope; however, the discovery API calls still execute and return data for whatever the identity is permitted to see, so the technique runs rather than being prevented outright.
- T1601partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who can modify device images by requiring authorization, segregation of duties, and regular review of access rights, which prevents unauthorized modification; however, network administrators legitimately need write access to device images, compromised credentials bypass the authorization process, and the control governs the provisioning process rather than blocking the modification itself.
- T1601.002partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who can modify network devices through provisioning, authorization, and review of access rights, so an actor without authorized access to the device's storage cannot replace the OS image; however, the technique can still be executed by anyone who holds legitimate administrative access (including an adversary who has compromised such credentials), and the control does not address OS image integrity, version pinning, or downgrade detection, so the prevention is bounded to the unauthorized-access slice.
- T1602partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, which constrains who can reach configuration repositories and so prevents unauthorized collection; however, authorized users (insiders with valid access) can still execute T1602, and protocol- or software-level exploitation of the management plane can bypass access-rights controls entirely, leaving a named remainder the clause does not reach.
- T1602.002partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who is authorized to access network device configuration files through provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so an unauthorized identity cannot retrieve them — the technique runs but does not succeed for that population. It does not prevent authorized users from abusing their access, does not address exploitation of management protocols (SNMP, Smart Install) themselves, and does not stop an adversary who has compromised valid credentials, so the prevention is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1610partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning, authorization, and review of access rights prevents unauthorized identities from deploying containers via Kubernetes/Docker APIs, but it does not stop an adversary who has compromised authorized credentials, who exploits a vulnerability in the container management interface, or whose legitimate scope already permits container deployment — so the prevention is real but bounded.
- T1613partialprevents — A.5.18 stops discovery by ensuring only authorized identities can query container APIs and dashboards and by removing unneeded rights, but it does not reach unauthenticated or exposed interfaces, or discovery by an already-authorized compromised identity.
- T1648partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who holds the permissions (e.g., IAM:PassRole, function-creation rights) that enable serverless abuse through provisioning rules, segregation of duties, and regular privileged-rights reviews, but it does not prevent the technique when executed by a legitimately authorized identity, nor does it address the serverless execution mechanism itself.
- T1649partialprevents — A.5.18 limits unauthorized access to certificate stores, private keys, and enrollment rights through least-privilege assignments and timely revocation, but it cannot stop an adversary who has compromised an authorized account or the CA itself, so it only partially prevents certificate theft or forgery.
- T1651partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning and review of access rights, so segregation of duties, privileged-access reviews, and least-privilege provisioning can constrain who holds the administrative access needed to abuse cloud management services; however, the technique exploits legitimate functionality available to any authorized administrator, and A.5.18 does not remove or restrict the cloud admin command services themselves, so it reduces the attack surface without preventing execution by those who legitimately hold the access.
- T1653partialprevents — A.5.18's provisioning and review processes can prevent unauthorized access that would allow an adversary to modify power settings, but the control governs access rights rather than system configuration, so it cannot prevent an already-authorized user or process from abusing powercfg or equivalent utilities.
- T1654partialprevents — A.5.18 restricts who can read logs by governing access rights, so unauthorized identities cannot enumerate them; however, any account with legitimate log-read access (including a compromised authorized account) can still perform the technique, and the clause does not address the technique's execution by those already entitled.
- T1657partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who can initiate or approve financial transactions through segregation of duties, authorization requirements, and timely revocation, which addresses insider abuse and unauthorized transfers via compromised accounts; it does not reach social-engineering vectors (BEC, pig butchering) where the victim is deceived into sending funds, nor external theft via third-party compromise, so the prevention is a slice of the technique's surface.
- T1666partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so a well-implemented regime limits which identities hold the privileged permissions (e.g., Global Administrator, organization-management rights) that T1666 requires; however, once an adversary has compromised an authorized account, A.5.18 does not stop them from calling CreateAccount, LeaveOrganization or transferring subscriptions, and the technique's mechanics run on valid credentials the control itself granted.
- T1669partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains the valid-accounts path into secured Wi-Fi by governing provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, but the technique also runs through open Wi-Fi networks and through compromised dual-homed third-party systems, neither of which the access-rights lifecycle reaches.
- T1673partialprevents — A.5.18 governs the provisioning, review and revocation of access rights, so where it is properly implemented only authorized identities hold access to the hypervisor/host and an unauthorized adversary has no account from which to run `esxcli` or `vim-cmd`; but it is a procedural/lifecycle control whose preventive effect depends on the technical enforcement in A.8.5 and A.8.3, and any adversary who has compromised a legitimate credential still reaches the technique, so the contribution is a slice rather than the bulk.
- T1675partialprevents — A.5.18 governs who is granted access rights to information and associated assets, including ESXi administration services, so proper provisioning, authorization, and review of privileged access rights constrains which identities can reach the vSphere/VMware Tools services the technique abuses. It does not prevent the technique from being executed by identities that legitimately hold those rights (whether authorized insiders or compromised credentials), and the clause sets requirements rather than mandating a universal mechanism, leaving a nameable remainder.
- T1677partialprevents — A.5.18 constrains who can modify CI/CD configuration files and referenced build files, preventing unauthorized direct and indirect pipeline execution, but it does not address the public pipeline execution scenario (where the adversary submits a malicious PR from a fork without needing repo access) and does not stop authorized users from being compromised or acting maliciously.
- T1686.001partialprevents — A.5.18's authorization, segregation-of-duties, and privileged-access review requirements constrain who can be granted firewall-modification rights in the first place, blocking unauthorized attempts; however, the technique's premise is an adversary with appropriate permissions, and A.5.18 does not prevent an authorized holder of those rights — or an adversary who has compromised such an account — from using them to modify cloud firewall rules.
- T1686.002partialprevents — A.5.18 governs provisioning, review and revocation of access rights to network device management interfaces, which constrains who can modify firewall rules; however, the technique still executes via compromised valid credentials, exploitation of public-facing management interfaces (T1190), or insider abuse of authorized access — none of which A.5.18 addresses.
Prevented OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risks (6)
OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) risk categories this ISO control helps prevent or mitigate — our analysis (mostly llm_verified).
Direction: ← other covers this;
→ this covers other (F/M/P = full / mostly /
partial). gov = governs / implements (a mandate, not coverage).
Why these map — rationale
- A01partialblocks — A.5.18 directly governs the provisioning, review, adjustment and revocation of logical access rights according to business rules, segregation of duties and policy, which squarely prevents the authorization-decision slice of A01 (missing checks, incorrect authorization, improper privilege assignment); it leaves untouched the non-authorization members of the category such as path traversal, CSRF and information exposure through sent data.
Control IDs, short titles and the structured attribute table (control type, CIA properties, cybersecurity-concept, operational capability, security domain) are facts from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A / ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The full implementation guidance prose lives in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 — not reproduced here. Cross-walks to NIST 800-53, NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS, CWE, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP Web Top 10 are our own analysis (mostly llm_verified), not an ISO, NIST, MITRE or OWASP product — how ours compare.