CVE-2026-40566

`imap_folders` (line 773) in `app/Http/Controllers/MailboxesController.php` pass admin-configured `in_server`/`in_port` and `out_server`/`out_port` values directly to `fsockopen()` via `Helper::checkPort()` and to IMAP/SMTP client connections with zero SSRF protection. There is no IP validation, no hostname restriction, no blocklist of internal ranges, and no call to the project's own `sanitizeRemoteUrl()` or `checkUrlIpAndHost()` functions. The validation block in `connectionIncomingSave()` is entirely commented out. An authenticated admin can configure a mailbox's IMAP or SMTP server to point at any internal host and port, then trigger a connection test. The server opens raw TCP connections (via `fsockopen()`) and protocol-level connections (via IMAP client or SMTP transport) to the attacker-specified target. The response differentiates open from closed ports, enabling internal network port scanning. When the IMAP client connects to a non-IMAP service, the target's service banner or error response is captured in the IMAP debug log and returned in the AJAX response's `log` field, making this a semi-blind SSRF that enables service fingerprinting. In cloud environments, the metadata endpoint at `169[.]254[.]169[.]254` can be probed and partial response data may be leaked through protocol error messages. This is distinct from the `sanitizeRemoteUrl()` redirect bypass (freescout-3) -- different code path, different root cause, different protocol layer. Version 1.8.213 patches the vulnerability.